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Since the 1940s, Minnkota Power Cooperative, Great River Energy (then United Power 
Association and Cooperative Power), Dairyland Power Cooperative, and East River Electric 
Power Cooperative in the Midwestern United States have deployed nearly 600,000 load 
management devices with their more-than 1.2 million member-owners. Building upon 
technological innovation systems theory and using case studies of the co-ops, I show the 
importance of intermediaries such as contractors and distribution cooperative managers in 
facilitating the deployment of these distributed energy resources for the co-ops. I then use 
common pool resource rules to highlight the intermediary functions that helped drive the common 
pool resource of the co-ops’ innovations. This research has implications for future decarbonized 
distributed energy resource deployments and the electrification of formerly fossil-fueled 
technologies. More widely, this study shows the potential need for appropriate levels, 
connectedness, and locations of polycentric governance within a far-reaching, deep, and 
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Energy transitions can depend on cooperation and competition within layers of polycentric 
governance (Cole, 2015; Köhler et al., 2019; Nowak, 2006; Ostrom, 2010). Cooperation and 
competition occur through implicit and explicit terms, through inactions such as technological lock-
in and incumbent non-participation, and through actions such as supply- and demand-side norms 
and policies. These multiple layers and centers of institutions and actors are important in the face 
of climate change, which as a problem of the global commons, will use any number of nested 
combinations of cooperation and competition to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
At the macro-level, currently there is little progress on limiting climate change-causing 
emissions. The United States’ carbon emissions rose from 2017 to 2018 by 3.4% (Plumer, 2019). 
Global carbon emission matched that trajectory, growing by an estimated 2.7% in 2018 alone 
(Hausfather, 2018). Some sectors are more responsible for these increases, yet all play a role in 
the continued growth of carbon-emitting resources. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) wrote in 2018 that “pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited 
overshoot would require rapid and far-reaching transitions in energy, land, urban and 
infrastructure... and industrial buildings” (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2018). To 
achieve no or limited overshoot of keeping global temperature rise under 1.5 degrees-Celsius, the 
IPCC says that carbon emissions must decline by 45% from 2010 levels by 2030, reaching net zero 
by 2050. 
From country to country, these sectors’ contributions to climate change vary. For example, 
Figure 1.1 below shows greenhouse gas emissions in different sectors over a 26-year time period 
in the United States (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2017). Electricity generation has 
shown downward emission trends in recent years, and other sectors have remained relatively flat. 
After years of electricity generation producing the most greenhouse gas emissions, electricity 





Figure 1.1: U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Economic Sector, 1990-2016. 
 
The switch-off between transportation and electric generation highlights that 
decarbonization will demand a multi-sector mobilization of approaches and policies (Harvey, Orvis, 
& Rissman, 2018). Yet within each sector, there are multitudes of dynamic, complex greenhouse 
gas emitters, and there can be considerable differences among them in governance models, 
business models, or infrastructure choices. Perhaps for these differences between and within 
sectors, or nations, the IPCC authors say there are no global precedents for large-scale energy 
transitions.  
The IPCC nonetheless says small-scale, fast-paced energy transitions around the world 
have continuously occurred within specific sectors, technologies, and spatial contexts. These 
energy transitions are the subject of repeated research and inquiry, each showing in their own way 
how a future sustainable and decarbonized energy system should or could occur (Köhler et al., 




not necessarily indicate future potential, they can show unseen connections and possibilities for 
creating a more equitable, faster, and efficient transition to decarbonization or sustainability in 
general (R. F. Hirsh & Jones, 2014) 
Through this paper, I intend to show possible transition paths and policies for an energy 
transition involving the mass mobilization of more distributed energy resources (DERs), which 
include energy efficiency, demand response, load management, distributed generation, and even 
the electrification of end-use technologies. DERs tend to play an important role in many climate 
change mitigation strategies. In modelled scenarios with no or limited overshoot of 1.5 degrees-
Celsius, the IPCC shows lower energy usage and faster electrification of fossil fueled end-uses is 
necessary to remain under the 2 degrees-Celsius warming scenarios. While there are other IPCC 
paths assuming a greater expansion of centralized carbon capture and storage plants, the 
International Energy Agency notes that more energy efficiency – from mitigating power plant 
conversion losses, to storing or shifting energy or actively reducing demand – is widely expected 
to be essential to meeting global carbon reduction goals in the coming decades (Geels, Schwanen, 
Sorrell, Jenkins, & Sovacool, 2018; International Energy Agency, 2017). Because distributed 
energy resources play roles regardless of a preferred national or global path to decarbonization, 
and because they impact many types of localities and regions, it’s necessary to understand how 
institutional and actor roles impact distributed energy deployment. 
For my study on actors and institutions, I use an often-overlooked geography of the energy 
transitions research. I look to the Midwestern United States and focus on electric cooperatives, 
whose history is specific to the United States, and their load management systems, whose controls 
allow them to turn on and off or modulate hundreds of thousands of water heaters, irrigators, air 
conditioners, and other technologies in their member-owners’ homes and businesses. Specifically, 
I look at four electric cooperative load management systems and their programs’ deployments in 
the 1940s onward: Minnkota Power Cooperative, East River Electric Power Cooperative, Great 




and Dairyland Power (Figure 1.2). Collectively, these co-ops deployed nearly 600,000 load 
management devices for their more-than 1.2 million member-owners between the 1940s and today. 
 
Figure 1.2: Service Areas of Five Generation and/or Transmission Cooperatives in the Upper 
Midwestern United States, Pre-1999. Every system except for Basin Electric Power Cooperative 
(delivering power to Minnesota Valley Cooperative Light and Power in western Minnesota) 
developed its own load management programs from the 1970s onward. Largely unregulated by 
national and state authorities, the generation and transmission cooperatives of the United States 
often span multiple states with member distribution cooperatives. The member distribution 
cooperatives share resources through these G&Ts: efficiency programs, billing systems, outreach 
efforts, and policy planning are just a few shared functions. While the service areas demarcated 
above represent present ties, they are the cumulation of years and decades of mergers, additions, 
and subtractions from each G&T service area. East River, for instance, was formerly all centered 





This research fills important research gaps that have potential policy and research impacts. 
In the energy transition literature, sub-national contexts are understudied, and localized niches are 
ignored both by research and many policy efforts (Graff, Carley, & Konisky, 2018; Mattes, Huber, 
& Koehrsen, 2015). In the academic literature, or policymaking more broadly, electric cooperatives 
in the United States are also not often the subject of focus (Lenhart, Chan, Forsberg, Grimley, & 
Wilson, Forthcoming). Moreover, these electric cooperatives’ history is often contained within self-
published or affiliate-published histories, leaving much shrouded about their structure, motives, and 
place within the energy landscape and general history of the United States.  
To inform my study of these electric cooperatives’ distributed energy resource-based 
transitions, I use current literature and theory on energy transitions, specifically the multi-level 
perspective and technological innovation systems. I examine the rate, means, and type of transition 
that allowed these electric cooperatives to deploy tens of thousands of distributed controls, 
communications, and devices in just a few years’ time, and sustain them for the decades thereafter 
as policies, personnel, and technology shifted. Finding that the cooperatives’ intermediary 
innovation functions help form polycentric governance models, I show that the creation of long-
lived and potentially-rapid deployments of distributed energy resources may be understood as 
management schemes for common pool resources (CPR). As energy transitions spanning multiple 
sectors or regions are often overlooked, and the important boundary-spanning and actor-
connecting roles of innovation intermediaries are often misunderstood, this research fills an 
important current need to understand how innovation is cultured and constructed (Kivimaa, Boon, 
Hyysalo, & Klerkx, 2019; Köhler et al., 2019). 
The electric cooperatives’ polycentric governance structures in deploying their load 
management programs allows for an examination of the promise and pitfalls of self-governance 
within energy transitions. In policy and politics, American electric cooperatives are often lightly-
regulated at the state and federal levels, instead governed mostly by democratically-elected boards 




generation and transmission cooperatives (G&Ts), on whose boards their board members vote, 
they must represent their interests within vertical and horizontal governances that can seem 
complicated to outside observers. For example, East River Electric Power Cooperative in South 
Dakota buys power from Basin Electric Power Cooperative and the Western Area Power 
Administration; in turn, it provisions electricity and infrastructure to 24 distribution cooperatives and 
1 municipal utility (Figure 1.3). Between these layers, some duties such as government affairs, 
marketing, and load management control are centralized at East River’s level, while others such 
as wholesale market activities or billing may be decentralized or shared at the power supplier or 
distribution utility. Each G&T/distribution utility system’s governance is independently determined 
by the member utilities of that system. These arrangements remain unique and negotiated 





Figure 1.3: Power Supply Network of East River Electric Power Cooperative. East River is 
unique among G&Ts in that in only supplies “T,” or transmission, to its member utilities, whereas 
many others provide both power and transmission. Additionally, several of its member utilities buy 
electricity from it only for peak power conditions, with the remainder buying all power from East 
River. These individual differences speak to the polycentricity of their and other G&T networks. 





Load management, also known today as “demand response,” also provides a useful 
framing lens to the polycentric transition: in shifting load, and determining how to appropriate costs 
and benefits, these cooperatives are necessarily negotiating the pace and legitimacy of their 
transition. Their transition does not directly involve clean energy or decarbonization; instead, it can 
allow for greater system flexibility with the control of customer-sited devices. Overall within the 
literature, load management’s development might be categorized around diffusion of end-use 
devices such as lighting or air conditioning (Sovacool, 2016). It might also fall under a subset of 
technologies today known broadly as “energy efficiency,” and be examined closely in conjunction 
with distributed generation and energy conservation (Geels et al., 2018; Kuzemko, Mitchell, 
Lockwood, & Hoggett, 2017). As Kuzemko et al. (2017) notes, “Demand reduction and energy 
efficiency, together with active demand side response, can also ensure the most efficient use of 
decarbonized generation capacity thereby also bringing down the overall costs of energy systems.” 
Therefore, load management, while not a complete energy transition to a new fuel or technological 
choice, is instead an intermediating transition that allows for new choices and potentials to be 
explored within the electric grid. 
Load management today is one of several ways to create a more efficient supply-demand 
relationship in the energy sector (Figure 1.4). While its usage in the past was constrained to devices 
like residential appliances and interruptible industrial demand, today loads such as electric vehicles, 
distributed energy storage, and microgrids can all participate in a more-distributed electric grid 
under demand response programs (Potter, Stuart, & Cappers, 2018). Even water heaters, some of 
the first load management devices to be used in the world in the early 20th century, are now 
considered by some to be the nation’s biggest battery, sitting idle in more than 50 million homes 
across the United States. These and other managed and electrified loads will have a heavy impact 
in any future state or national decarbonization efforts (Clark W. Gellings, 2017; Vibrant Clean 





Figure 1.4: Comparisons of Load Curves and Impacts from Load Management, 
Conservation, and Electrification. These generalized load curves show the relative impact of 
each type of “load management” practice. These load curves should not be taken as scripture, 
however: different conservation measures will have different time impacts. For instance, a more 
efficient A/C unit will impact late afternoon loads the most. Likewise, controllable water heaters, 
depending on their control system, could shed peaks, valley fill, or even perform flexible load 
shapes in response to intermittent renewable generation or wholesale market fluctuations. Adopted 
from (World Bank, 2005). 
 
With one-way communication systems built in the 1970s and ‘80s, these cooperative load 
management systems remain alive today. They are in various levels of participation with wholesale 
markets, and in varying levels of repair or re-creation to two-way communication. Their grid impact 
is in megawatts and electrified, off-peak energy sales, but their full value may be in the unveiling of 
social infrastructure, governance models, and deployment efforts that allowed co-ops to deploy 
hundreds of thousands of load management receivers and end-use devices around a six-state 
region for more than four decades. 
My theoretical framework centers on maintaining that these electric-cooperative are 
polycentric actors who, to deploy and sustain the distributed energy resource of load management 




The remainder of this thesis is focused on examining how and why those functions and common 
pool rules came into play and, more generally, answering the question, “How did these 




 Electric cooperatives, load management, and polycentricity and energy transitions are 
covered in the sections below with a brief history of their origins, their organizations and people, 
and their practices and theories. Some gaps in the knowledge base presented below are expected, 
especially with electric cooperatives, whose histories remain somewhat hidden. 
2.1. Electric Cooperatives in the United States 
 
In the United States, 834 electric cooperatives provide only 12 percent of all electricity 
sales, but stretch across 56 percent of the nation’s land (EIA, 2018; National Rural Electric 
Cooperative Association, 2017). They serve an estimated 42 million people in 47 states and source 
power, in part, through 63 generation and transmission cooperatives (G&Ts), which are 
cooperatives of the distribution cooperatives. The G&Ts often have requirements contracts with 
their member cooperatives, stipulating how much power the distribution cooperatives can self-
supply, if any.  All-requirements contracts, which say that distribution cooperatives must purchase 
all power from the G&T, exist for many distribution cooperatives.  
These electric cooperatives exist alongside investor-owned and municipal utilities, who 
provide more than 51 and 11 percent of electric sales, respectively, in the United States today. 
Other forms of electric utility ownership include retail power marketers, behind-the-meter third 
parties, political subdivisions, federal and state governments, and community choice aggregators, 
who collectively provide the remaining 26 percent of sales in the United States, according to the 




Electric cooperatives trace back to the Rochdale Equitable Pioneers Society, an English 
mutual self-help organization formed in 1844. It sold products such as butter and sugar and 
returned surplus profits to its member-owners (Boland, 2017). The Rochdale model spawned 
principles that became the International Cooperative Alliance’s seven principles in 1995. Today, 
there are many kinds of cooperatives – from farm supply to homecare providers – with varying 
structures, roles, and purposes. Importantly, cooperatives can span many types of ownership and 
subsidiary models that respond to member-owners’ shifting needs, showing organizational 
characteristics that reduce risk (e.g. by over-accumulating stock and prioritizing equity over 
efficiency more than in investor-owned utilities) (Chaddad & Cook, 2004; Sexton, 1986).  
Electric co-ops in the U.S. are a type of consumer cooperative. Legally, they are considered 
nonprofit corporations so long as 85 percent or more of their annual income comes from member-
owners (University of Wisconsin Center for Cooperatives, n.d.). Each electricity consumer within 
an electric cooperative service area currently are de facto member-owners (though not historically, 
given state-to-state variation on exclusive service area laws). Each member-owner has one vote 
for the utility’s board of directors, who come from the community and help make decisions regarding 
the co-op’s policy, finance, and operations. Excess margin is allocated to membership on varying 
cycles, sometimes at spans of more than twenty years, due to the long-lived nature of electric utility 
operational costs. These capital credits or patronage are based on the amount of electricity that 
member-owner has consumed and returned proportionate to usage. 
Cooperatively-owned electric utilities in the U.S. emerged at-scale out of the New Deal 
legislations of the Great Depression-era, but their early forms were numerous across the world, 
including the U.S. (Doyle, 1979): 
Farmers and rural communities were organizing for electric service on their own 
behalf in several regions of the country at least a decade or more before 1930. 
Early advocates of rural electrification in the United States pointed to the success 
of rural electric cooperatives serving farms in Germany, Sweden, Denmark, and 
Ontario during the early 1900s. In 1920… a group of farmers in southwest Idaho 
formed a non-profit mutual company and built 256 miles of electric lines to obtain 




a group of Minnesota farmers near Granite Falls also formed a cooperative, buying 
power at three cents per kilowatt hour (kwh) from a municipal system… By 1923, 
thirty-one electric cooperatives had been incorporated in nine states. By 1930, 46 
co-ops were operating in 13 states. 
 
Despite early progress in rural electrification in the United States, aided in large part by 
local universities and electric utility trade organizations, incentives to spread electric lines to the 
countryside were not enough for investor-owned utilities to act quickly enough (R. Hirsh, 2018). In 
the 1930s, more than 90 percent of the electricity sales came from private utilities, 70 percent of 
which were controlled by just eight companies (Cebul, 2018; Spinak, 2014). Some historians felt it 
was a matter of time before these investor-owned utilities would find profit in their uneconomic 
power lines to build out completely to farms (Cebul, 2018). Yet private electricity companies were 
facing their own troubles, too, with the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, which enabled 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission to break up their many-tiered, monopolistic holding 
companies (Ellis, 1966).  
In 1935, the federally-created Rural Electrification Administration (REA) emerged by 
Executive Order. It first gave support to for-profit utilities in electrifying the countryside, as many in 
society at the time bemoaned any government involvement in the environs of private electric 
business. Yet early successes with the Tennessee Valley Authority’s sponsored creation of electric 
cooperatives were beginning to gain acceptance within various state agencies. These nascent 
cooperatives often fell short of complete “area coverage,” which meant that only through 
economies-of-scale, or complete electrification of the countryside, could rural electric grids be built 
economically.  
In 1936, with the passage of the Rural Electrification Act, the REA was directed to give low-
cost loan preference to non-profit entities. Newly-formed federal power agencies such as the 
Tennessee Valley Authority and the Bonneville Power Administration were directed to provide low-
cost hydro power to the cooperatives as “preference” customers. The first administrator of the REA, 




also help organize them with their own personnel (Ellis, 1966). Against other forms of ownership, 
cooperatives won out as a political compromise because there was no other utility ownership form 
available that could legally or politically complete the job (Spinak, 2014). At the least, lest there be 
more government involvement in private business, promoting cooperatives was a tool to help 
coerce the IOUs into providing cheaper electricity rates.  
In 1937 the REA drafted model electric cooperative laws for states to follow (National Rural 
Electric Cooperative Association, 2016). As massive organizing efforts followed, rumors of the 
government condemning farms for the potential insolvency of the cooperative at first stunted the 
growth of electric cooperatives in places such as Minnesota (Severson, 1962). Hard-fought 
volunteers walked up and down roads for $2 to $5 in per-person equity contributions. Skeptical 
farmers often stood still, waiting for others to purchase a lightbulb or get pestered by extension 
agents for utility pole easements before they could commit to joining in the new infrastructure.  
Beyond politicking, new member-owners of the cooperative faced additional hurdles: the 
REA required fair wholesale power prices and minimum numbers of member-owners per mile of 
line before it would approve loans. Once the cooperative lines were energized and rates were 
established, new consumers often faced high bills. In this way, the early cooperatives depended 
on economies-of-scale in member-owners and sales, self-determined governance, and federal 
loans. 
Electric cooperatives, for their reliance on federal debt, drew criticism from others like 
Cooperative League, who represented cooperatives made more from member-owner equity, less 
on debt. They and other groups eventually settled their grudges as these consumer-owned utilities 
grew in numbers: by 1939, the REA helped establish 417 new cooperative and just a year later that 
number increased by more than two hundred (New Deal Network, 2013; Reynolds, 2014). Where 
in 1935 only 10 percent of farms had electricity, by 1953 more than 90 percent had the lights on 




appliances, overall consumption growth, and parts of “modern” life that were heavily marked by co-
ops (Spinak, 2014). Rural America was beginning to change. 
The electric cooperatives began scaling. Starting in the ‘30s, they co-created under joint 
ownership schemes generation and transmission facilities across the United States. The earliest 
“G&T” formed was the Wisconsin Power Cooperative in 1938, which later merged with another like-
organization to become Dairyland Power Cooperative. (Ellis, 1966). Other cooperatives banded 
with each other to form transmission cooperatives, buying energy from G&Ts and forming a three-
tier structure between generation, transmission, and distribution cooperatives. Data gathered in the 
1970s reveals that nearly 30 percent of cooperative power in that time was sourced by G&Ts, up 
from less than 10% in 1940; federal and investor-owned utilities provided the remaining 70 to 75 
percent, having alternated in greater shares of sales to cooperatives since 1940 (Doyle, 1979). 
From the 1950s on, state agencies for cooperatives that performed legislative and 
educational duties remained important, but largely were shunned from the REA’s financing process. 
The agency instead took a larger role in the day-to-day scruples of its co-ops, directing them on 
rate-setting norms, providing education to board members, and many other activities (Spinak, 
2014). Despite the direct federal support, shifting federal politics often interfered with the programs 
as presidencies and legislatures seemed to alternate over the next decades in their helpfulness 
and obstruction, raising interest rates on loans and delaying action on others, creating uncertainty 
for new power projects. In the 1970s, REA loans and loan guarantees increased greatly: for 
generation plants alone, for whom cost overruns were becoming the norm, the increase was more 
than 900 percent over a few years. To cope with political instability, the co-ops also grew their own 
financing sources: the REA provided 100 percent of all cooperative funding as late as 1970, the 
National Rural Utilities Cooperative Finance Corporation (CFC) and other financiers stepped in to 
fill as much as 25 percent of funding in 1974 (Doyle, 1979). These financing shifts coincided with 
the fortification of requirements contracts between G&Ts and member utilities, foretelling the 




Hundreds of thousands of rural customers were coming online every year in the ‘60s and 
‘70s, and with the growth of G&T systems, more money was directed toward larger-scale, 
centralized coal- and nuclear-generating stations. Historically, co-ops were un- or little-regulated at 
the local, state, or federal level: in 1970s, public utilities commissions oversaw their rates in some 
form in only 21 states (Doyle, 1979). A portion of their external regulations came from the REA 
itself in the form of rate and infrastructure planning approvals. These approvals were necessary for 
any rate changes by REA borrowers up until the late 1990s, at which point the REA had merged 
with other departments to become the Rural Utilities Service (RUS) (National Rural Utilities 
Cooperative Finance Corporation, 2008; U.S. Department of Agriculture, Rural Utilities Service, 
2013).  
The 1970s saw large disruption for electric utilities that forever changed their outlook. 
Electric cooperatives were not spared: their costs began to rise, and customer demand began to 
plummet (Figure 2.1). These consumer-owned utilities, who served mostly residential farm or non-
farm member-owners, began to shift from pseudo-government agencies, based on large amounts 





Figure 2.1: Average Usage and Revenue from Residential Member-Owners of REA/RUS-
funded Electric Cooperatives, 1950-2010. Prior to 1970, electricity prices fell and consumption 
rose rapidly. However, the 1970s saw increasing inflation, escalating fuel prices from the 1973 oil 
crisis, and larger, centralized power stations that became stranded as customer usage began to 
peter out in the late 1970s. Source: (Richard. F. Hirsh, 1999; U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
Rural Utilities Service, 2013). 
 
The generation and transmission cooperatives based in and around Minnesota that are the 
focus of this study weren’t that different from other generation and transmission cooperatives of the 
time in the United States. While their member cooperatives had merged up, even these G&Ts 
began to merge together, creating a network of co-ops that continues to span six states and 

















with member utilities, with 




Energy Sales for Resale (MWh): 
7,283,628 
 
Member-owners Served: 136,447 
members at 11 co-ops and 12 munis at 
Northern Municipal Power Agency 





with member utilities with 
5% self-supply limit; some 
member utilities on fixed 
power contracts 











Energy Sales for Resale (MWh): 
13,339,075 
 
Member-owners Served: 695,000 
members at 28 co-ops 
East River Electric Power 
Cooperative 
Transmission Cooperative, 
buying power from Basin 
Power Cooperative and 








Energy Sales for Resale (MWh): 
3,997,139 
 
Member-owners Served: 126,517 







with member utilities, 250 




Energy Sales for Resale (MWh): 
5,891,455 
 
Member-owners Served: 262,542 
members at 24 co-ops and 17 municipals 
Table 2.1: Summaries of Examined Cooperative Utility Subjects, as of 2017. Basin Electric 
Power Cooperative, serving Minnesota Valley Cooperative Light and Power, is not listed here as a 
study subject, although it serves as a power provider to East River Electric Power Cooperative, 
alongside the Western Area Power Administration. Minnesota Valley has no load management 
program, and therefore Basin was not a study subject. Sources: EIA Form 861, 2018, utility 











2.2. Load Management, Energy Policy, and the 1973 Oil Crisis 
 
“Load management” is the practice of a utility deliberately controlling electric 
customers’ load curves. This is different from “demand response,” which encompasses 
both customer- and utility-controlled loads. These terms are again different from “demand-
side management,” which encompasses both demand response and efficiency and 
conservation measures (Figure 2.2). While these terms have all been used 
interchangeably, especially in the beginning of the mainstreaming of the technologies in 
the 1970s on, I use “load management” as a technological subset of DERs, and a specific 
term to denote utility control and facilitation of demand-side technologies.  
 
Figure 2.2: Nested Definitions of Demand-side Management, Demand Response, 
and Load Management. While the diagram above classifies load management as a 
capacity service for reliability, the studied electric cooperatives here also used it for 
strategic load-building of energy sales. In other words, not all load management acts as 
capacity reduction or peak shaving and can perform many other grid services such as 
emergency shut-off or frequency control that are not reflected here. Source: (North 





The concept of “load management” dates to the growth of the electric grid in the 
early 20th century at utilities across the United States and Europe (Richard. F. Hirsh, 1999; 
Mitchell, Manning, Jr., & Acton, 1978). From the beginning, the goal of load management 
was to use the electric grid and its power plants more efficiently by spreading loads evenly 
throughout the day. Samuel Insull, an early assistant of Thomas Edison, and later 
monopolist of electric utilities across the U.S., first used the term to describe enticing 
diverse loads such as appliances and industrial loads to his various electric utilities’ grids. 
As he discovered, because electricity depends on instantaneous balancing of supply and 
demand of power, the less “peaky” a grid’s power was over a certain timespan, the more 
efficiently the fixed costs of power plant and power lines could be sized and run. Therefore, 
a win-win could be made: Insull could get more sales and revenue from the system, and 
cheaper power and energy was provided for all users (Cudahy & Henderson, 2005; 
Yakubovich, Granovetter, & Mcguire, 2005).  
The concept of “load factor,” which is a ratio of average load to peak load within a 
certain time span, served as a metaphor for a grid’s efficiency and a rationale for later 
definitions of load management. The closer to 100 percent a load factor gets, the idea was 
and is, the more economically a grid is thought to run. For example, balancing a morning-
peaking electric cooperative with an evening-peaking electric cooperative means that the 
system, perhaps under one G&T, has higher load factor and better utilization of fixed costs 






Figure 2.3: Load Factors of Hypothetical Electric Co-ops. Cooperative A has a noncoincident 
or individual peak at 11 a.m. with relatively low load through the night and early morning, giving it 
an average load of 17.7 MW compared to a maximum load of 36 MW (17.7/36=Load Factor of 
49%). Adding to Cooperative A the load of Cooperative B, which peaks later in the night, makes 
their coincident or system peak occur at 3 p.m. (in gray). Because the two cooperatives peak at 
completely different times of the day, their system’s coincident peak falls on neither of the individual 
peaks and their coincident load factor (62%) is higher than either’s individually. 
 
 
These competing and cooperating peaks and system priorities help frame the electric grid 
as a set of resource decisions and compromises, to build and/or not build supply and demand. The 
decisions have nested, polycentric relationships as to how utilities collect costs from customers and 
their various classes. Cost attribution remains a political and social process. Allocating fixed costs 
proportionate to customer class usage – known as cost-of-service or average-cost pricing – 
became in these early days a mainstay of American electric utility practice and regulation. This was 
due to Insull’s “growth dynamic” strategy of intense monopoly utility and revenue building 
(Yakubovich et al., 2005). Marginal pricing methods – which reflect the cost of each additional 
kilowatt or kilowatt-hour sold often according to the time-of-day or level of the electric grid – 
emerged too. But at least in the United States, these marginal pricing methods existed only on a 
niche level for many utilities, serving as discounted pricing to attract new loads or in rare spots, to 




















Hour of the Day
Co-op A: 49% Load Factor
Co-op B: 53% Load Factor




The differences between average- and marginal-cost pricing reflected some amount of 
decisions in risk mitigation. Typically, cost-of-service pricing relies on the assumption that a utility 
is expected to receive a reasonable rate-of-return on its historic investments, which are collected 
through an averaging out of expected revenues from each customer. Average-cost pricing 
produces more certainty on revenue for utilities than marginal cost pricing, which are constructed 
by utilities or regulators to recover anticipated future short- and long-run costs (Pikk & Viiding, 
2013). As these short- and long-run revenues may fail sometimes to recover the short-run fixed 
costs of the system, marginal prices may have to be periodically adjusted to maintain fiscal sense. 
In the early 20th century, while utilities were building out supply and demand, and 
recovering their costs through average and marginal cost pricing, some utilities across the globe 
began experimenting in controlling loads, the latest definition of “load management” (Bonneville 
Power Administration, 1977). In the early days, the need for load management was often to avoid 
building under-utilized infrastructure. In Switzerland, where large-scale hydroelectric dams 
powered a remote grid, controllable water heaters were a popular form of energy storage since at 
least the 1920s. By the mid-1970s, the city of Basel, Switzerland, reported an 80 percent adoption 
rate of utility-controlled residential water heaters, and Hamburg, Germany, apparently had 50 
percent of its total load under control, according to the Bonneville Power Administration.  
In the mid-20th century, following World War II, there was a surplus of demand and a deficit 
of generating capacity across the world. In response, load management policies and utility practices 
in Europe co-evolved with still-nascent marginal pricing theory and practices (McKay, 1979). In 
1950s France, industrial time-of-day rates shifted load to off-peak times to defer large generation 
and transmission buildouts, and with aggressive marketing in the late 1960s, 600,000 controllable 
water heaters were deployed across the country in just a few years’ time. Other countries such as 
Germany and Finland used centralized control of water heaters and space heating to stave off the 
need for peaking gas and oil plant additions. South Africa and New Zealand also experienced large 




These lessons were slow to the United States. One executive with the Central Vermont 
Public Service Corporation felt the United States’ case for load management was quite different 
from Europe’s, as the United States as still focused more on meeting demand with peaking power 
plants, while Europe was more focused from the beginning (after World War II) on shifting load to 
under-utilized parts of the day with lower peaks (Bonneville Power Administration, 1977). America 
still built power plants, Europe deferred power plants, in other words. The executive also suggested 
that European utilities, with heavy state investment if not ownership, were more likely to be less 
sensitive to a potential loss of revenue from marginal pricing, with the state serving as backstop to 
potentially bad investments. 
When the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries decided to halt U.S. oil 
exports in ’73, it was a shock to American electric utilities. Electricity prices began to climb, and in 
general, customer demand began to flatten. Stranded power plants and transmission emerged from 
a failure to collect on these massive capital investments (Richard. F. Hirsh, 1999).  
With an allowed rate-of-return for shareholder equity invested in new capital projects, 
investor-owned utilities experienced a widening gap between what costs were allowed by their 
regulators and what was actually recovered (Corey, 1979). Fighting for advance recovery and other 
mechanisms to reduce their uncertainties, many of these private utilities were beginning to 
experience revenue loss. Their ground was getting shaky in other places, too: credit rating agencies 
downgraded many utilities’ debt, growing inflation devalued the utility investments, and regulatory 
uncertainty and delay grew as oil prices soared.  
Simply, electric utilities’ investments in supply couldn’t run in pace with unpredictable 
demand (thus revenues). Meanwhile, the oil crisis spurred a series of legislative wins for demand-
side practices. Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, the Energy Conservation and 
Production Act of 1976, and the National Energy Conservation Policy Act of 1978 provided the 
policy basis for load management and energy conservation at the federal and state levels 




Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act of 1978 (PURPA) was enacted to compel state regulatory 
authorities and utilities to take into account marginal capacity and energy prices as they offered 
contracts to independent power producers or built their own cost-of-service ratemaking processes 
(Mahoney Jr., 1979). PURPA also recommended various load management practices to be 
investigated alongside other generation and non-generation in the burgeoning field of demand-side 
management. Notably for this study, these regulations pertained to utilities under state regulatory 
authorities, and only to nonregulated electric utilities (such as co-ops) if they chose to adhere to 
them. 
These motions toward load management followed a general trend that pushed U.S. utilities 
to notice customer preferences. While some electric utility managers had grown distant from their 
customers’ needs, according to Hirsh (1999), other utilities had already been practicing load 
management and demand-side management for years. One utility in the Pacific Northwest reported 
using time-controlled water heaters since the 1940s (Puget Sound Energy, 2016). The practice of 
time-switching load appears to have been widespread in niche experiments among other utilities, 
as well. Other programs were robust: Detroit Edison Electric’s 200,000 water-heater program 
began in the 1930s as a promotional effort to outcompete natural gas companies, later turning to 
time- and radio-control in the ‘60s (Special Committee On Aging, United States Senate, 1979).  
Load management popped up elsewhere. In the 1950s, under pressure from G&Ts that 
priced their power supply based on noncoincident peak demand (the demand of the individual 
distribution electric cooperative), or from their own physical constraints, some electric cooperatives 
were said to begin to install their first load management programs (Clark W. Gellings, 2017). In the 
1970s, Wisconsin Electric Co. purchased 150,000 controlled water heater units for its customers, 
following approval from the Wisconsin Public Service Commission. Elsewhere, from the early ‘70s 
on, with dozens of studies and pilots into marginal pricing, load management permeated the 
nations’ utilities’ planning processes. Many appeared from partnerships with the U.S. Department 




The 1970s saw a dual-pronged approach emerge to handle unpredictable demand 
patterns: load management focused on the utility controlling demand-side systems, while pricing 
or customer-based load management focused on customers responding to price signals with their 
own systems (Table 2.2). The two approaches achieve close to the same result in theory, but with 
different probabilities of success: load management granted more certainty of load management 
deployment and control for the utility, while customer-controlled load management relied on 
customer-borne costs and achieved more uncertain results from unpredictable customer behavior.  
Table 2.2: Comparison of Utility- and Customer-controlled Demand Response Strategies 
Adapted from (Rocky Mountain Institute, 2006). 
Many early load management programs centered on water heaters, a kind of thermal 
energy storage, but many different types of end-use controllable technologies were available in the 
1970s (Table 2.3). To facilitate these technologies, communication systems allowed the utility to 
remotely control a load management receiver from their headquarters (Table 2.4). One- or two-way 
communication equipment allowed the utilities, customers, and their devices some customizability 
in how they distributed control over their devices. Control strategies began to include explicit and 
implicit combinations of utility and customer negotiations including direct customer requests to 
switch control of the device; scheduling the devices’ usage in aggregate with other devices; and 
price response to arbitrage real-time or time-of-use prices at the utility level (Rabl, 1988). 
 Utility-controlled  Customer-controlled 
Strategy More command-and-control More market-based 
Objective Load is directly controlled, 
curtailed, interrupted, or scheduled  




most of the 
cost 
Utility Customer 
Who controls Utility Customer 
Customer 
Rates 
Reimbursed for load management 
device usage; marginal or time-of-
use rates 
Time-of-use rates, demand charges, 
or other marginal price signals 
Technology 
options 
Control receivers on load 
management devices with 
communication system backbone 
Load management devices, time-of-









Water, in-ground, ceramic, wall, and other systems allowed the utility to 
charge reservoirs on off-peak periods, allowing the medium to slowly 
release heat throughout the day or night. Sized from residential to 
industrial. 
Cool storage 
Water, ice, ceramic, and other systems are cooled during off-peak 
periods to provide air conditioning or cooling services. 
Customer-owned 
generation 
Back-up generation, often in the form of small diesel gensets, is 




A/C and water heating units are controlled to minimize peak power times. 
Interruptible 
Includes controlling when factory service, irrigation, and grain dryers, and 
other loads can run. 
Dual-fuel 
Electric heat is switched to wood, natural gas, propane, or another fuel 
during peak energy periods. Also used as valley-filling technology. 
Self-contained 
Interlocks (which prohibit the use of simultaneous loads), demand limiters 
(which disconnect load if too much power is drawn), time switches, and 
temperature-controlled switches are automatically manage customers’ 
loads. 
Utility-actuated 
Substation cutoff from the grid and utility warning signals (in the form of 
phone calls, TV or radio ads) 
Sources: (Argonne National Laboratory, Systems Control, Inc., Gordian Associates, Inc., & Temple, 
Barker and Sloane, Ince, 1980; Donovan, Hamester, & Rattien, Inc., 1979; Morgan & Talukdar, 
1979; Rabl, 1988)  
 





Signals between 140 and 750 hertz are injected into power 
lines by a utility. They’re interpreted by a decoder at an 
endpoint. Signals are transmitted and read and any time and 
point in the network. Most popular network worldwide. Can be 
one- or two-way. 
Radio 
Receivers and transmitters use radio waves to communicate. 
Can be directed toward specific devices. Popular in U.S.. Can 
be one- or two-way. 
Power line carrier 
Signals between 5 and 300 kilohertz are injected into power 
lines by a utility. Popular alongside radio and ripple. Two-way. 
Pilot wire 
Independent communication wire strung to customer’s 
premise. Two-way, no examples of use found. 
CATV 
Existing cable TV systems are used for communication. Two-
way. 
Telephone 
Existing telephone lines are used without interference to 
customers’ regular telephone service. Two-way. 




From these beginnings in the early 1970s and ‘80s, load management coalesced into an 
overall portfolio-based approach known as demand-side load management, or DSM (Gillingham et 
al., 2004; Richard. F. Hirsh, 1999)(Gillingham et al., 2004; Richard. F. Hirsh, 1999). In 1985, 259 
utilities were reported to be involved in the control of more than 2.5 million loads, the majority being 
water heaters (Rabl, 1988). Tens or hundreds of thousands more devices were also under 
customer-control or by time switch, which automatically turned on and off certain devices without 
utility or customer intervention.  
Over the next thirty years, coinciding with the advent of federal wholesale energy markets 
in the mid-2000s – which with PURPA effectively softened utility control of electricity supply in the 
United States – utilities and other third parties expanded control of customer retail devices. This 
included more two-way, real-time communications networks. While utilities had experience with 
wholesale electricity practices through power pools such as the Mid-continent Area Power Pool in 
the past, the pooling of electricity across states through wholesale markets such as the 
Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO) was a new economic and political frontier. 
By 2017, 247 utilities were reported to have more than 5 million customers in direct load 
control programs (EIA, 2018). In that same year, the EIA reported more than 9 million consumers 
were a part of a demand response program, which included customer-controlled devices. In all, a 
2018 survey of nearly 160 utilities found that 40 percent of demand response capacity was 
customer-controlled (Chew, Feldman, Ghosh, & Surampudy, 2018). From air conditioning to water 
heaters, while also including newer technologies in electric vehicles and energy storage, the survey 
found more than 18 gigawatts of enrolled demand response in total, representing 2.8 percent of 
peak demand across the utilities surveyed.  
A count of 160 utilities did not comprise the total of more than 3,000 electric utilities, 
however, seeming to leave out the nation’s many electric co-ops. As mentioned previously, starting 
in the 1950s, many cooperatives began a long history with load management. They shifted into 




side of the meter”  (C. W. Gellings, 1981). According to a 1978 survey of its nearly 1,000 member 
utilities, the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association found that 330 of about 360 responding 
cooperatives were “involved in varying degrees in load management, conservation, weatherization, 
and research projects” (Doyle, 1979). Of the 330, only 42 had load management programs in place. 
Those programs blossomed in the 1980s (Shah, Sanger, & Mashaw, 1984). 1982 reported 
92 cooperatives with load management programs, with an additional 79 implementing “indirect” 
load management such as voluntary commercial and industrial curtailment. Minnesota had the 
most cooperative load management programs of any state with 25.  
Today, all but one of the 45 cooperatives in Minnesota has a load management program, 
and load management programs stretch across all states in the Midwest in general. Those 
cooperatives’ programs, which are the focus of this study and are aggregated by their generation 
and/or transmission cooperatives, are summarized below (Table 2.5). The composition of those 
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Table 2.5: Summary of Historical and Current Deployments of Load Management 
Technologies at Minnkota, Great River Energy, Dairyland, and East River electric 
cooperatives. Across all 4 G&T systems, according to available data sources, there are nearly 
600,000 load management receivers for more than 1.2 million member-owners, representing a 
nearly 50% penetration rate, although some member-owners are known to have more than one 
managed device. Due to data limitations from state, federal, and utility sources, some kilowatt and 
number totals are mismatched by year. Sources: Survey responses, interviews, utility integrated 
resource plan filings with the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, and (Dairyland Power 








Figure 2.4: Recent and Current Megawatt Deployment of Different Load Management Device 
Types at Minnkota, Great River, Dairyland, and East River. Minnkota, like many of the co-ops, 
segments their load management devices into qualitative- and time-based categories (e.g. “Cat. 
II”) for temporal and geographic diversity. Other cooperatives’ load management totals contain 
many more types and sub-types of devices than reported here. Great River Energy’s water heaters, 
for instance, include both peak-shaving and thermal storage water heaters. Data sourced from 
electric cooperative staff or utility integrated resource plans with the Minnesota Public Utilities 
Commission. Megawatt totals represent estimates that vary based on the temperature and load 




2.3. Energy Transitions, Intermediaries, and Polycentric 
Governance 
 
My theoretical framework centers on polycentric electric-cooperative actors who, to deploy 
and sustain the distributed energy resource of load management devices, manage a common pool 
resource of the electric grid. They do so through intermediary innovation functions, or those actions 
and roles that act as facilitator between two or more parties in the innovation process. To show 
how these functions change and are negotiated through time, I follow research that hypothesizes 
phases of technological innovation systems (TIS) have formation, stabilization, and decline periods, 
arguing that decline can instead involve re-creation (Markard, 2018a). Below I will summarize 
current energy transition and common pool resource theories that lead to this general framework. 
The field of energy transition research is relatively new, dating to the 1990s. Generally, the 
energy transition field means to study the shift of a nation or economic sector from one energy 
system to another through the diffusion of energy sources of technologies (Graff et al., 2018). It is 
a subsect of the larger sustainability transition field, which is more broadly related to “grand societal 
challenges” in domains such as water, resources, food, mobility, education, and other goods 
geared toward preservation and conservation (Loorbach et al., 2017).  
Broadly, two major theories inform current energy transition literature: the multi-level 
perspective (MLP) and TIS (Table 2.6). Within the MLP, innovation occurs within niches, which can 
diffuse and co-evolve into existing socio-technical regimes amid broader, slow-moving landscape 
changes (Geels, 2014; Geels, Sovacool, Schwanen, & Sorrell, 2017). Change in the MLP is 
produced by realigning trajectories between levels, increasing momentum of niche innovations, 
weakening path-dependent existing systems, and making opportunity through landscape level 





Figure 2.5: The Multi-level Perspective. Source:(Geels & Schot, 2007) 
 
Adjacent to the MLP, the TIS consists of “networks of actors and institutions that jointly 
interact in a specific technological field and contribute to the generation, diffusion and utilization of 
variants of a new technology and/or a new product” (Markard & Truffer, 2008). In order to produce 
and diffuse an innovation, a number of subfunctions must be performed, including market 
formation, entrepreneurial experimentation, influence on the direction of the search, resource 






Table 2.6: Theories of Energy Transition. Sources: (Araújo, 2014, 2017). 







Between a nested niches, regimes, and 
landscape levels, co-evolving practices emerge 
among technology, users, policy, and cultural 
meaning, among other facets. Change is 









Innovations are generated, diffused, and used 
through a series of subfunctions from a series 
of actors and institutions. The strength and 
scale of the subfunctions, along with the 
relationships between them, determine 
whether change occurs. 
 
In the energy transition literature, among the MLP and TIS, most studies tend to focus on 
the macro-level, within single sectors, usually at the national or international levels. As a result, 
sub-national contexts are understudied, leaving gaps in the understanding of polycentric transition 
actors at the local or regional levels (Graff et al., 2018; Mattes et al., 2015). This trend toward the 
macro- has been criticized because it “implicitly ignores the uneven implications for specific 
communities that are affected differentially, both positively and negatively,” says Graff et al. (2018). 
Mattes et al., using Regional Innovation Systems to identify distinct cognitive, organization, social, 
and geographic subsystems of small-scale socio-technical configurations within the MLP, added 
further clarification that subsystems of polycentric or centralized actors can coevolve with an energy 
transition in highly different ways. 
It’s important now to recognize the inherent polycentricity of the electric grid today. The 
grid, as it exists in many parts around the world, contains layers of generation, transmission, and 
distribution, each with their own geographic or temporal institutions to manage electricity services. 
Cooperatives embody these layers, being separated into G&Ts and distribution cooperatives. 
Often, the distribution cooperatives will contract with other wholesale, federal, or private power 
sources for electricity services, while maintaining electricity provision at the distribution level within 
their internal and external networks of member-owners, contractors, outreach associates, and 




distinct, adjacent duties, their coordinated and uncoordinated actions symbolize that change, 
occurring through innovation processes as the MLP and TIS state, is always a function of 
institutions that manage the grid in all its socio-technical politics. 
Across the grid, then, small-scale changes at locations such as distribution utilities can be 
as patchwork and localized as other technological adoptions and diffusions. These differences 
relate to larger energy transitions and institutions across the grid, as relationships and power 
dynamics unfold in important ways in energy transitions. In the MLP, these dynamics relate to 
incumbents, who are mostly thought to resist change. This is important for electric cooperatives, 
as they represent regimes whose interests in deploying load management must co-evolve with their 
incumbent technological power supply preferences of centralized power (Geels, 2014). Some 
research has suggested that incumbents are not static or locked-in monoliths; rather they exist 
within historically unstable or stable environments and adapt within disparate levels of internal 
resources and business models (van Mossel, van Rijnsoever, & Hekkert, 2018). Over time, it 
seems, incumbents do not disappear with new, competitive technology or ways – they reorganize, 
learning through trial-and-error to change, to survive. 
Incumbents can change, and small-scale and collective actors known as “intermediaries” 
throughout the niches and regimes can help them and other small-scale actors and innovation 
processes to co-evolve (Kivimaa et al., 2019). As defined by Kivimaa et al. (2019), and as followed 
for this research, intermediaries are: 
…actors and platforms that positively influence sustainability transition processes 
by linking actors and activities, and their related skills and resources, or by 
connecting transition visions and demands of networks of actors with existing 
regimes in order to create momentum for socio-technical system change, to create 
new collaborations within and across niche technologies, ideas and markets, and 
to disrupt dominant unsustainable socio-technical configurations. 
 
More simple a definition, intermediaries act as “an agent or broker in any aspect of the innovation 
process between two or more parties” (Howells, 2006). Intermediary actors have been found in 




international levels (Gliedt, Hoicka, & Jackson, 2018; Schot & Kanger, 2018). They lie within 
research that seeks to distinguish actors from the governance, innovation, and sectors they operate 
in, seeking to find how these actors mediate decision-making in networks of actors (Fischer & 
Newig, 2016; Michael Hodson, Marvin, & Bulkeley, 2013; Mike Hodson & Marvin, 2010).  
At any point in time, there is an overall ecology of intermediaries with different 
competencies responding to and shaping innovation systems (Kivimaa et al., 2019). Actors that 
take on intermediary functions have been found to shift functions as the innovation system matures 
and declines, acquiring and losing different roles as new technologies or institutions come into view. 
As other studies have found that supportive structures for technological innovation systems are 
deliberately created and maintained through formal and informal networks and collectives, these 
intermediary functions can also serve as examples of mutually agreed-upon roles and contributions 
to the common good (Musiolik & Markard, 2011; Skjølsvold, Throndsen, Ryghaug, Fjellså, & 
Koksvik, 2018). Because the MLP pertains to broader system level changes, and the TIS diffuses 
into segmented functions and actors, fitting the nested institutionalism of the electric cooperatives, 
I choose to focus my study on the TIS intermediary functions (Table 2.7) while maintaining aspects 






























and training; provision 
of advice and training. 





Selecting a direction 
to allocate resources 
to; incentives to 
develop/ adopt 
certain technologies 
or practices; visions 
of the future. 


















learning and reduced 
uncertainty. 
Creating conditions for 
learning by doing and 
using. 
Policies stimulating new 
entrepreneurship and 
diversification of existing 









and establishment of 
innovation. 




prototyping and piloting; 
investment in new 
businesses. 
Regulation‐induced 














configuring and aligning 
interests; technology 
assessment; arbitration 
based on neutrality and 
trust; accreditation and 
standard setting. 
Problem and justification 










Creation and facilitation 
of new networks; 
managing financial 
resources; identification 
and management of 
human resource needs 
(skills); project design 
and management. 
Subsidies, educational 





Entry of new actors 
into the TIS; benefits 
to other actors or 
sectors. 
Creating new jobs. 
Policies promoting more 
responsible corporate 
practices. 
Table 2.7: Technological Innovation System Functions, Intermediary Functions, and Related 
Policies. Sources: Adapted from (Bergek et al., 2008; Kivimaa et al., 2019; Kivimaa & Virkamäki, 





Importantly, these ecologies of intermediary innovation functions are carried out by actors 
and institutions that closely resemble polycentric governance schemes. Polycentricity, as Elinor 
Ostrom wrote, is a system characterized by the multiple opportunities by multiple actors to both 
compete and cooperate at different scales (Cole, 2015; Ostrom, 1990, 2010). The Paris Agreement 
was built upon many of Ostrom’s precepts, challenging participants to build networks of trust for 
voluntary carbon reductions (M. Cooper, 2016). Against top-down regulation or privatization, which 
are theorized by some to be the only ways of managing a common pool resource (CPR), polycentric 
modes of governance are based on coordination, trust, transparency, and legitimacy between many 
actors and institutions to manage a resource. They can blend in market rules and mandates into 
their structure, but the resource management remains largely self-negotiated. Their nodes are often 
nested within a hierarchy of constitutional, collective choice, and operational rules that determine 
eligibility, provisioning, and appropriation activities at different levels of resource production and 
consumption.  
First developed by Ostrom, basic rules to govern common pool resources are encapsulated 
in a set of eight design principles, which help indicate the longevity and success of managing a 
resource (Cox, Arnold, & Villamayor Tomás, 2010). Below, I match these rules with conditions 











Common Pool Resource Design 
Principles 
Applicability to American Electric Cooperatives 
1A. Clearly defined user 
boundaries 
Each distribution cooperative, and each member-
owner has a right to use and receive electricity sales. 
There are also some rights to self-generate or to not 
receive sales. 
1B. Clear boundaries of resource 
system 
American electric cooperatives often have exclusive 
service areas. Between G&T and distribution 
cooperatives and member-owners, there are 
boundaries between responsibilities. 
2A. Congruence with local 
conditions 
Distribution cooperatives set tariffs and choose to 
apply programs according to local conditions. 
2B. Benefits of appropriation and 
provision inputs are proportionate 
All demand and energy sales are billed according to 
principles of cost causation, likewise rewarding load 
management participation proportionately to member-
owners and distribution co-ops. 
3. Collective-choice arrangements 
Within a representative form of government, member-
owners can vote for board members of the distribution 
cooperative and advocate for changes locally with co-
op staff. Distribution co-ops can advocate and vote for 
changes at the G&T or larger wholesale levels. 
4A. Monitoring users 
Meters tell demand and energy sales for distribution 
cooperatives and their member-owners. 
4B. Monitoring the resource 
Cooperatives monitor both member demand and 
supply of their own power systems through substation 
and individual member meters. Load management 
receivers, though, can be faulty in readings. 
5. Graduated sanctions 
Electricity, generally, can be disconnected for non-
payment, though graduated sanctions remain difficult 
overall. Failure to respond to load management 
events sometimes resulted in financial penalties, as 
negotiated through contract.  
6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms 
Board policies and cooperative bylaws regulate 
conflict resolution mechanisms. State regulatory 
agencies can provide other avenues for resolution. 
7. Minimal recognition of rights to 
organize 
Distribution electric cooperatives are largely 
unregulated by states, although there are challenges 
with wholesale market integration and occasional 
state and federal policy mandates.  
8. Nested enterprises 
Member-owners own distribution cooperatives; 
distribution cooperatives own generation and 
transmission cooperatives; between member-owners 
and between the distribution cooperatives, there can 
be additional nested enterprises.  
Table 2.8: Design Principles for Successful Common Pool Resource Management Groups 
as Applied to Electric Cooperatives and Their Load Management Programs. Rules are 





Other authors have provided ways to think about electricity and its infrastructure as a 
common pool resource (Goldthau, 2014; Pless & Fell, 2017). According to Pless and Fell (2017), 
the capacity and energy components of electricity make it subtractable (one’s consumption, in real 
time, subtracts from the quantity available to others and affects their usage), while the voltage, 
frequency, and reliability components make it non-excludable (it’s close to impossible to exclude 
consumers from consuming voltage, frequency, and overall reliability on a given network). 
Electricity, in this way, exists as a bundle of inseparable services with which private interests can 
subvert the collective good. A “tragedy of the commons” for the cooperatives, specifically, exists in 
the danger of too much demand or too little at any given time by private interests, or too much or 
too little infrastructure in the long-run. This gives way to an inefficiently run and planned grid in the 
long-run, or blackouts and high costs in the short-run. 
 Some research has tried to draw out these common pool resource design principles into 
empirical case studies on smart grids and demand response (Melville, Christie, Burningham, Way, 
& Hampshire, 2017). Few papers, it seems, connect energy transitions and innovation to 
polycentric actors and institutions, even as some like Goldthau (2014) argue that polycentricity can 
be a lens to analyze increasing numbers of actors, distributed energy resources, and tailored and 
working solutions for an increasingly decarbonized grid. This research gap is important because, 
in recent years, other scholars have introduced concepts of power dynamics, institutional 
mediation, and polycentric governance to energy transition research to help understand why 
climate change mitigation efforts appear to have stalled (Breetz, Mildenberger, & Stokes, 2018; 
Geels, 2014; Goldthau, 2014; Kuzemko, Lockwood, Mitchell, & Hoggett, 2016). This suggests that 
political durability and institutional understandings can be just as important to fighting climate 
change as economic and technological deployments.  
Despite these learnings, the field (and public discourse more broadly) has been criticized 
for its lack of attention on the political creation of technology deployments and transitions (Stokes 




distributed energy deployments: it allows the somewhat-apolitical TIS and MLP to better 
encapsulate the constant self-negotiations and intermediations that belong to American electric 
cooperatives in deploying and sustaining their distributed energy resources of load management 
devices. In creating shared, rivalrous resources of peak power demand and supply, the co-ops 
generated a sub-infrastructure and commons to the already-present infrastructure and commons 
of wires and centralized generation. G&Ts and distribution cooperatives and their member-owners, 
in this way, employed systemic and niche intermediary innovation functions, navigating between 





 To better understand the histories of electric cooperatives managing their common pool 
resources of load management, I apply TIS intermediary functions to three distinct phases of their 
programs, formation (1940s to 1970s/’80s), stabilization (1980s to 2000s), and re-creation (2000 
to present), to see how the commons was maintained over time. While drawing out intermediary 
functions, I incorporate aspects of common pool resource design principles into the TIS 
intermediary functions and into the results’ narratives to help identify the polycentric regimes in 
which they exist. 
Given my focus on deployment and negotiation between actors and institutions, and not 
necessarily early stage research and development of the technologies themselves (as had already 
happened with load management technology in the mid-20th century), I apply only TIS intermediary 
functions of market formation, resource mobilization, and legitimation to the time periods. Here I 
imagine that resource mobilization is defined by more education and training resources, roles that 




stage research and development work. I also allow for co-determined policies to be included in 
market formation.  
To incorporate polycentric themes, I amend the TIS intermediary functions as follows. I 
imagine the legitimation function of the TIS to share the second and third design principles of 
common pool resources, as updated by Cox et. al (2009): congruence with local conditions, 
appropriation and provision, and collective choice arrangements. This creates a new definition that 
follows others’ conceptualization of legitimation as “created in a collective, social process involving 
organizations such as technology developers, experts, associations or interest groups” (Markard, 
Wirth, & Truffer, 2016). For market formation and resource mobilization, with which many specific 
common pool resource design principles could apply, I name basic definitions of the functions that 
denote polycentricity (Table 3.1).  
Table 3.1: Summary of Study’s Dimensions 
TIS/CPR Design 
Principle 
Description Followed for Intermediary Roles. 
Market Formation Demand and demonstration for new or existing technologies are co-
created by TIS users using various CPR design principles. Functions 
include influencing demand with co-determined policies; acceleration 
of the application and commercialization of new technologies; 
prototyping and piloting; investment in new businesses. 
Resource 
Mobilization 
Organizational growth and emergence are facilitated through co-
creation by TIS user. Functions include creation and facilitation of new 
networks; managing financial resources; identification and 
management of human resource needs (skills); project design, 





Local conditions and proportionate or fair benefits and costs are 
negotiated between individuals within the TIS system and its other 
functions. Functions include gatekeeping and brokering; configuring 
and aligning interests; technology assessment and evaluation; 
arbitration based on neutrality and trust; accreditation and standard 
setting. 
 
Choosing to study particular electric cooperatives – Minnkota Power Cooperative, 
Cooperative Power Association, United Power Association, Dairyland Power Cooperative, and 
East River Electric Power Cooperative – I used a “most similar systems” study design, allowing me 




deployment (Levy, 2008). I selected the cases following the report that Minnesota had the most 
cooperative load management programs of any state in the nation as of the early 1980s (Shah et 
al., 1984). This state-based selection also helps to isolate the effect of any Minnesota state policy 
on cooperative action during the period studied. To study the development of deployment and 
polycentric decision-making, I also took a longitudinal perspective to help trace the process of each 
program and further isolate clarifying variables.  
Data for this study came from primary and secondary data on utility load management 
deployment and adoption, as well as semi-structured interviews that I performed with current and 
former cooperative employees. Given that this is in part an exploratory study, cooperative 
employees were given priority for interviews, although some affiliates in industry or associated 
organizations were consulted as part of background interviews. I also conducted background 
interviews with some of the eventual on-record interviewees, who provided useful framing and 
background information for the interview protocols and documentary research. As on-record 
interviews do not total a saturation of information, I used primary and secondary historical 
documents to fill in information gaps. 
With the background interviewees’ referrals and subsequent purposive sampling, I 
recorded on-record interviews through the months of February and March 2019. A total of 10 
interviews were conducted with 5 distribution cooperative employees and 8 generation and/or 
transmission cooperative employees, resulting in more than 822 minutes of interviews, with many 
more minutes spent in background interviews with current and former cooperative employees. I 
conducted most interviews over the phone, except for two, which occurred at G&T headquarters. 
A semi-structured interview protocol was used to find out how the cooperatives deployed 
and created opportunities for adoption of load management technologies (Appendix A). I coded 
interviews for intermediary functions and common pool resource design principles, then processed 
them through case study comparisons, review with primary and secondary data, and process 




and co-create questions and brainstorm conclusions of the research, following aspects of 
participatory action research.  
 Historical load management deployment data was requested from each electric 
cooperative, both at the G&T and distribution levels. Due to the scarcity of publicly available or 
compiled historical information at the utility, load management rollout data was also collected from 
academic papers, historical articles, the U.S. Energy Information Administration, or presentations 
available online. All data sources are cited in-text. 
 Anonymity was offered to individuals and distribution cooperatives and not to the 
generation and transmission cooperatives. The choice was grounded in a debate over the naming 




The results follow Table 4.1 below. Placing results into narratives, I synthesize interview 
results with cited documentary evidence. I use the term “G&T” here to mean Minnkota, Cooperative 
Power, United Power, Great River Energy, East River, or Dairyland generally, even though East 
River owns only transmission.   
In both the table and subsequent narratives, I seek to name either the G&T or distribution 
cooperative as providing TIS intermediary services, which serve to help manage the common pool 
resources of load management devices and the grid more generally. I apply these functions over 
semi-distinct formation, stabilization, and re-creation time periods, labeled below. While I expect 
there to be some overlap between TIS intermediary functions (i.e. what’s marked as “Legitimation” 
could apply to “Market Formation”), I use the definitions in Table 3.1 in the “Methodology” section 




helps clarify the amorphous roles that transition intermediaries take to support the overall system 
of innovation and diffusion. 
In each period, following the MLP, I also describe other competing or cooperating regimes 
and broader landscape dynamics. This helps to explain and explore the external pressures the 
cooperatives saw in deploying their load management programs in their niches. For the purposes 
of my description, regimes are understood as distinct socio-technical groups relating to a 
technology, while landscape changes are broader trends (i.e. flattening energy usage rates) that 
impact the cooperatives and other electric utilities in their day-to-day operations and collective 
choice efforts. 
Where neither a G&T or member cooperative is mentioned in the table below, it should be 
assumed that both helped provide this function. This doesn’t mean to say that each of the studied 
G&T systems performed these functions, but it does mean that at least one G&T or distribution 
cooperative was represented in these functions. Combining summary and specifics across and 
within cases allows my case study approach, with its small sample size and tendency to focus on 














Table 4.1: Summary of Results 
 Formation: 
1940s to 1970s/’80s 
Stabilization: 
1980s to 2000s 
Re-creation: 
2000s to Present 
Landscape 
Interactions 
• Rapid growth post-
WWII  
• Industrialization of 
farming 
• Power plant industry 
cost overruns  
• Sudden flattening of 
growth in 1970s and 
early 1980s with 
spiking interest rates, 
farm crisis 
• Stabilization of farm 
economy leads to more 
growth 
• Policy pushes for 
deregulation  
• Increased suburban 
growth 
• Increased C&I presence 
• Recession 
dampens growth 
• Policy push for 
decarbonization 
• Digitalization and 
data intensive 
industries emerge  




Fossil-fuel heating regimes in rural areas with increasing presence 
 
Growth of commercial and industrial loads, digital 




- Member cooperatives 
move to coincident 
peak of all 
cooperatives, rather 
than individual peaks 
- Member cooperatives’ 
monthly demand 
charges become 
annual or seasonal 
- G&T and distribution 
cooperatives pilot new 
load management 
technologies 
- G&T create off-peak 
electricity rates to 
member cooperatives 
- Creation, at member 
cooperatives, of varied 
marginal rates and 
incentives 
- G&T create of end-use 
device distribution 
businesses 
- Distribution cooperatives 
and G&Ts create 
















Agriculture consolidates, remains cornerstone of co-op service areas, 





1940s to 1970s/’80s 
Stabilization: 
1980s to 2000s 
Re-creation: 
2000s to Present 
Resource 
Mobilization 
- G&Ts aggregate 
cooperatives into 
Department of Energy 
grant and other 
funding 
- G&Ts provide funds 
for early explorations 
of load management 
technologies 
- G&Ts and power 
suppliers manage 




- G&T and distribution 
cooperatives provide 
mass education and 
coordination with local 
contractors  
- Distribution cooperatives 
integrate load 
management with new 
homes developers and 
other contractors’ 
businesses 
- G&Ts negotiate 
manufacturer deals on 






marketed by G&Ts 
and member 
cooperatives 
- G&Ts aggregate 










- Generational and 
cultural issues, 
barriers to initial 
adoptions, are jointly 
overcome  
- Mediated opposition to 
rate impacts through 
rate studies and 
committees through 
direction of G&T 
- Control strategies are 
debated, leaving G&Ts 
with centralized control 
and member 




- G&Ts mediate actual 




- Negotiation of 
deployment strategies 
and informal standards 
with local contractors and 
consumers  
- Iterative operational 




- Cooperatives balance 
needs of in-house 
expertise and external 
contractors 
- G&T organize utility 
partners to shift 
wholesale power rates 
and defend contract 
provisions  
- Integration of member co-
op programs into state 
policymaking and 
decision-making 
- As member co-ops 
integrate into 
wholesale power 
markets and with 
third-party 
vendors, G&Ts 
begin to lose 
centralized control 
















4.1. 1940s to 1970s and Early 1980s: Formation 
 
4.1.1. Regime and Landscape Interactions with the Niche 
By the 1970s, a series of global, national, and regional events brought load management 
into focus for the cooperatives (Table 4.2). In this decade, each cooperatives’ rationale for load 
management drew on a central theme, where electricity consumption and supply had begun a 
volatile period of mismatched resources. Massive 5-or-more percent growth in sales year-over-
year were driven by electrified industrial, residential, and agricultural practices, such as automatic 
irrigation systems, dairy coolers, electric home heating, and air conditioning. As the 1970s wore 
on, interest rates rose, and by 1980, recession had begun to strike after repeated oil embargos. 
East River had their rates from Basin Electric Power cooperative nearly triple from 1970 to 1980, 
and one interviewee reported UPA rates doubling in just a few years’ time (Holt, 2007). The 
cooperatives, either in forecast or in real-time, had economic throes, and past large capital 
















Table 4.2: Summary of G&Ts’ Reasons for Initializing Each Program. Sources: Interviews and 












1973 oil crisis and need 
to defer costly baseload 
generation additions 
Winter peaking, the cooperative would 
save member-owners money on fuel 
costs through dual fuel, contribute to 
national energy independence, and 






Coal Creek generating 
station cost overruns by 
late 1970s create great 
debt 
With hundreds of millions of dollars to 
pay on Coal Creek, off-peak load 
management program would help pay 
off the power plant through increased 





Projected cost increases 
at peaking power plants 
create uncertainty, and 
two-hour “needle peaks” 
from concentrated “chore 
time” energy usage on 
system in early 1970s 
create a poor load factor 
Load management, a non-generation 
alternative, avoided expensive 







Farm crisis with Antelope 
Valley generating station 
debt service from Basin 
Electric Power 
Cooperative create great 
member-owner costs 
Confronted with increasing demand 
charges from Basin, and lowered 
allocations of cheap hydro from 
Western Area Power Administration, 
East River sought load management to 
decrease wholesale billing costs and 
help defer member utility costs  
 
Large power plants were increasingly contentious at a societal level as well as in 
Minnesota. Ongoing opposition to CP and UPA’s Coal Creek power plant in North Dakota and its 
high voltage transmission line filled the state regulatory agencies with siting and public participation 
issues. By the late 1970s, increasingly militant farmer-protestors were responded to by the 
governor calling on the National Guard (Reagan, 1979; Wellstone & Casper, 2003). But even 
before, Northern States Power Company’s nuclear power plants were built under heavy opposition, 
and their Sherco and Minnesota Power’s Floodwood-Fine generation projects saw large public 
disputes. Combined with industry issues and new environmental regulations, building large facilities 




In public hearings for siting Coal Creek’s power lines in Minnesota in 1975, the advocacy 
group Minnesota Public Interest Research Group (MPIRG) identified “load management” as a 
possible alternative to the power plant and its lines. MPIRG said Cooperative Power and United 
Power Association’s application contained no discussion whatsoever of the possibilities for shifting 
demand, conservation, or renewable energy (Wellstone & Casper, 2003). It may have been that at 
the time, no one thought any of those alternatives were possible compared with large-scale power 
generation. In granting the eventual certificate of need to the program, the Minnesota Energy 
Agency director at the time wrote, “Existing state and federal conservation programs and any 
possible new programs are not likely to have a significant impact on the Applicants’ energy and 
demand projections for the short term” (Wellstone & Casper, 2003). Yet these ideas, from as far 
away as Europe, or from other American utilities or these G&Ts’ own member cooperatives, had 
already began to percolate in time clocks and early communication systems (Figures 4.1 and 4.2). 
  
Figures 4.1 and 4.2: Time Clock (Left) and Powerline Carrier Receiver (Right) from an Iowan 
Electric Cooperative. Early permutations of load management were relatively plug-and-play, such 
as time clocks, which with a simple turn of the hand, allowed for customized control of on-farm 
electricity demand. Powerline carrier receivers, requiring more advanced communication over 
power lines, were more advanced, requiring communication networks to be set up. Source: 






4.1.2. Market Formation 
 The market for electric cooperative load management had to be made internally. Prior to 
the 1970s and ‘80s, each distribution cooperative was billed by the G&T for their own individual 
peak, noncoincident with other cooperatives. This aligned costs with individual needs, as each 
member co-op ultimately had to build out distribution systems to accept their own peak power. By 
voting to move to a coincident peak, however, each cooperative would be incentivized by a demand 
charge to avoid power usage during a collective peak of all the member cooperatives within a G&T 
system. While individual cooperatives might have to build out their distribution grids to handle their 
noncoincident peak, they now had to worry about a coincident peak demand charge as well, one 
that was often scores higher in aggregate than the old noncoincident demand charges.  
 Choosing to constrain themselves to a coincident peak of all member cooperatives – which 
in almost every case was an annualizing or seasonalizing of a demand charge alongside smaller, 
monthly demand charges – the member co-ops chose what was necessary to translate system 
needs into individual market signals for the good of load management. The change was accepted, 
grudgingly, it seems. It meant a loss of control from the distribution cooperatives, no longer having 
to worry solely about building their own system and demand. They now had to worry about building 
for the collective peak (and common good of the G&T system), as well.  
The dual considerations were challenging for balancing the priorities of the individual co-
ops within the infrastructure. “It’s like having 27 kids”, says Larry Thorson, former Director of Energy 
Management for Dairyland Power says. Allowing distribution cooperatives to build and maintain 
their own load management systems was considered, but ultimately dismissed by all this study’s 
G&T systems as being too disorganized for greater load management deployment and efficiency. 
“Some of you can go your own way,” says Thorson, “[but] you just know there's going to be some 
headaches going down the road when somebody says, ‘I didn't get the signal.’”  
It was better, everyone decided in the end, to have these rates centralized, an imposition 




rates had the side-effect of snapping different distribution co-op approaches to retail rate setting 
into focus, says Jeff Nelson, former manager of East River’s load management program, and 
general manager of East River in later years. Prior to the program, each cooperative had their own 
rate philosophy: different levels of fixed charges, meter charges, and energy charges began to be 
harmonized as cooperatives experienced a common cost and rate structure. As Ostrom (1990) 
relates in her hierarchy of rules, from the highest G&T and their constitutional rules of rate 
structures, down to the distribution cooperative and their collective choice structure, member-
owners using the common pool resource in operational or day-to-day rules began to see system 
transformation through their retail rates and load management programs offered to them. 
Pilot projects were an essential part of testing the effectiveness and monitoring of each of 
the end-use devices and the communication products in the G&T-sponsored load management 
programs. But that didn’t prevent member cooperatives from using the technology. Thorson 
recounts that even as the G&T was exploring load management, Cedar Valley – a forerunner to 
Iowa-based Heartland Electric – acquired their own radio control system to get ahead of the game. 
Other co-ops had been ahead for some time. Going into the 1950s, a couple interviewees estimated 
that at least a dozen or so cooperatives in the G&T systems also had invested in early power line 
carrier and radio technologies to help stem the peaky loads from on-farm welders and newly 
electrified dairy operations. These technologies rose during the 1950s and ‘60s, but ultimately died 
off as the grid became more interconnected with other utilities, more dependent on centralized 
supply, and less constrained on their own individual physical capacities of distribution wires and 
poles. 
The cooperatives that engaged in early forays into load management had a jumpstart on 
the market when G&Ts began to push their programs. More widely, many distribution cooperatives 
also had their own electrification programs from years past, formed to indiscriminately build load 
with electric heating, stoves, water heaters, and other types of appliances. These homespun shops 




and other electric home products to consumers) allowed cooperatives to tailor offerings to their 
service areas. By the 1970s, the co-ops’ early electrification and load management efforts had 
instilled confidence in the distribution cooperatives’ communal abilities to sell products to member-
owners, allowing for some additional ease in retrofitting appliances with load management 
communication receivers.  
Individual abilities and opportunities of the member co-ops and G&Ts also helped inform 
and create later common pool uses. For Minnkota, a large regional shopping center in Fargo, North 
Dakota, symbolized this collective learning process. The mall was facing budget shortfalls from the 
impending oil costs in 1973. The mall’s electric cooperative, Cass County Electric Cooperative, 
offered to electrify its heating arrangements for off-peak times, leaving its oil as the peaking energy 
solution (Gustafson, 1981). This unique partnership helped fortify the dual fuel solution as the 
primary load management solution that Minnkota wanted to pursue, allowing the G&T system to fill 
in valleys with off-peak electricity, while clipping peaks by interrupting electricity with fossil fuels, 
thus ensuring its overall load factor never lessened (see Figure 1.4 for a basic illustration of 
competing, cooperating peaks). 
 
4.1.3. Resource Mobilization 
 G&Ts often aggregated their member utilities’ equity, used their own, or sought external 
funding to help identify and promote the load management programs. One notable example of 
seeking funding for a common purpose was United Power Association. In the middle of heated 
dispute over the Coal Creek generating station and resulting powerline, and fresh off suggestions 
from advocates to implement load management and conservation instead of building a power plant, 
by 1976, UPA had decided to apply to the Rural Electrification Administration for a load 
management study. The G&T wrote, “This will cost money but in the long run it will be more 
economical than building new plants and lines if we can reduce demand” (United Power 




That REA grant shifted into a project with the newly-formed U.S. Department of Energy, 
with facilitating help from the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (Minnesota Historical 
Society, 1978). Test load management projects were rolled out in partnership with member 
cooperatives such as Crow Wing Power, tracking metering and performance data from electric 
thermal room storage demonstrations or electric water heater aggregations. “It was after the 
[Department of Energy] project that proved some of those things out,” says Gary Connett, a former 
manager of demand-side management with Great River Energy.  
Often, multiple options were consulted adjacent to or in place of load management, a 
process often intermediated by the G&T and assisted by input from individual member utilities. This 
optionality was emphasized by the systems approach that East River took on behalf of its member 
cooperatives to better their collective load factor. With an external consultant, Burns & McDonnell, 
the cooperative assessed conservation, improving transmission and distribution equipment to 
prevent losses, simple load management like time clocks, and even renegotiating wholesale power 
costs. East River, however, was unique: unlike other G&Ts, they were tied to Basin Electric Power 
Cooperative and the Western Area Power Administration for power needs and faced distinct 
demand and energy charges that other G&Ts only saw in their own power plants or marketplaces.   
The end costs of deployment and the communication systems were not trivial for any G&T 
system. East River’s alone was close to 20 percent of their total asset base. But the G&T, as an 
aggregator of interests and resources, alone had the finances and human resources to coordinate 
the discovery and rollout of the projects and alternatives. Negotiations without side vendors for 
communication techs was likewise investigated by G&Ts: in the case of Minnkota, they traveled to 
Switzerland for product demonstrations, while other cooperatives such as Dairyland chose to 
survey and tour with other utilities like Oglethorpe Power Corporation in Georgia or Buckeye Power 
in Ohio.  
What these G&Ts were doing at the time was relatively unprecedented for these 




with radio control towers or ripple injection sites at substations, they didn’t have full certainty that 
the technology could even work fully for their use. As one manager said, there were no guideposts 
or manuals to read. Indicative of this pioneering activity, by 1980, Mel Nelson, the lead on 
Minnkota’s load management program, reported that only seven large-scale load management 
programs existed at the time; and of them, only Minnkota’s was aimed at annual load factor 
changes, not just daily or weekly (Nelson, 1981a).  
G&Ts, as intermediaries of individual utility interests, leveraged economies of scope and 
scale that individual cooperatives never could, at least in the initial phases of the TIS. Devoting 
themselves to exploration, the G&Ts aggregated risk and made it palatable for the group, even as 
individual co-ops explored and deployed their own load management systems. 
 
4.1.4. Legitimation with Local Provisioning and Collective Choice 
  Each load management program, as it was sold to member cooperatives and their 
member-owners by the G&Ts and some advocate member systems, was controversial, even 
among staff. Having returned from World War II deployment to electrify the countryside, many of 
the older generations of staff in each cooperative felt the load management programs were empty 
promises. After all, these staffers had seen what reliable, cost-effective electricity did for their peers 
and their families. “No longer were people that lived out in the country second class citizens,” says 
Jeff Nelson.  
Now in the 1980s, coming out of the oil crisis and the farm crisis, was a “tough philosophical 
change to ask guys” to now turn off lights, says Nelson. “Guys who lived through [World War II] … 
it wasn’t just a casual meal… they were committed.” 
 The older generation viewed it as a breach of their social contract to offer interruptible, 
controlled electricity. Even though it was a voluntary program for both distribution co-ops and 
member-owners, negotiated down in East River and other G&Ts from a mandatory program, it was 




at cooperatives that embraced the change and deployment strategies before their older 
counterparts, indicating a social solution that was co-created by the cooperatives’ own internal 
diversity of resources. 
 There were other shifts that happened. The shift to a coincident peak had to lead to a shift 
in mindset: “Share the pain, share the gain,” says Jeff Nelson. East River had to find a “sweet spot” 
among the 25 individual cooperatives, balancing costs and benefits and perceptions of them. Using 
their rate studies and consulting reports as authoritative boundary objects, the G&Ts could then 
better pitch the load management systems to member cooperatives. For East River, that meant 
politicking at least 13 out of 25 member utilities to agree to a “Yes.” Nelson remembers it was the 
only closed-box ballot vote he’d ever seen, after many arguments and anger against it, including a 
study funded by a member cooperative to debunk Burns & McDonnell’s initial feasibility study.  
But for the most part, Nelson said of the 12 opposing votes, some weren’t “all in” on 
opposing it. “They were just worried,” he says. “I guess a lot of us were.” At Dairyland, that same 
vociferous opposition to load management, even on the day of the board vote, died down. Thorson 
remembers one board member pounding his fist on the table one moment, and then just before the 
vote settling down. That board member said, “I don’t like it, but it’s the right thing to do.” Dairyland’s 
vote was almost unanimous in favor. 
 After the votes to commit to load management, the heart-strain was not over. Some 
managers now felt the pinch of having to hire new member services personnel. For them, too, it 
was anxiety-provoking to think of an irate customer calling after a cold shower from an empty water 
heater. Yet the other situation, where the co-op didn’t deploy load management, was ruined by the 
threat of heaping demand charges.  
Those demand charges, which were being avoided in the present by other member 
cooperatives with load management deployments, would increase in future years for all co-ops in 
the G&T system. The G&T had to, no matter what, collect demand charges for its fixed costs of the 




related pains. Only off-peak sales and peak-shaving from controlling electrified loads could help 
ease present costs, and ease the uncertainty of the future costs for an individual co-op. As a 
common incentive, if load management was deployed collectively among all co-ops, costs could 
be deferred and evened-out for everyone in the G&T system, despite however unevenly those 
demand charges might affect individuals in the present. 
Faced with these certain present costs and uncertain future costs, the co-op managers 
were “between a rock and a hard spot,” as Thorson says. A “friendly competition” ensued between 
the co-ops to sell more off-peak power and cut more peak demand, according to Thorson.  
Sometimes the competition was one that individual distribution co-ops wanted to avoid. To 
win these laggards over, sometimes that competition’s impact on nonparticipants would be 
lessened initially through the pooling of rebates or accounting practices that would effectively delay 
the impact of costs or revenues associated with a new power plant or rate structure. Cross-
subsidization worked both ways here, balancing perceptions of future and present costs, signaling 
fairness to non-adopters and adopters alike, showing that the appropriators of this common pool 
resource would engage all perspectives and local conditions to deploy load management. 
It was necessary, then, to engage each cooperative on its own terms, fitting the technology 
to individual and communal preference all at once. Minnkota’s system, winter-peaking for the 
unrestrained electric heating growth of prior years, still had many rural customers relying on fuel oil 
or wood for heat during the winter – dual fuel technology, in that case, was a specific fit to the 
northwest corner of Minnesota that hadn’t the fossil fuel penetration of other regions. For East River 
customers, concerned as they were about the farm crisis, and with heavy on- or off-farm residential 
usage, water heaters were a natural initial fit for the program, though the programs would later turn 





Figure 4.3: East River Device and Kilowatt Penetrations of Load Management, as Compared 
to Customer Totals, in 2010. Those cooperatives with the most customers didn’t necessarily 
achieve the highest penetrations of load management receivers, and it was those with special 
resources (such as grain dryers or commercial and industrial accounts) that often achieved the 






The load management programs also acted as a pressure valve for the co-ops and G&Ts, 
offering some consciously-provided financial relief to customers where agricultural commodity 
prices plummeted, interest rates rose up to 20 percent, and farmers were losing land to banks. 
Though interviewees from other G&T systems didn’t bring up impacts of the farm crisis, its presence 
is known to have loomed over their programs, being one component of rapidly rising electricity 
rates. For a G&T like Dairyland and its member co-ops, load management was a solution for an 
angry customer, welfare that once again signaled fairness and agency. In this way, the legitimacy 
of load management was determined throughout the nested, polycentric levels of G&T, co-op, and 
customer, tracking price signals through the chain of power supply and demand, creating social 
and institutional solutions to match at each juncture of the provisioning. 
 
4.2. 1980s to 2000s: Stabilization 
 
4.2.1. Regime and Landscape Interactions 
The load management boom times started with rural areas, often at the behest of the more 
suburban cooperatives. The reason was simple: lack of competition from fossil fuel. “Rural 
areas…that's where the opportunities were,” says Connett. “The metro co-ops just sort of shrugged 
their shoulders and said, ‘Everybody here has natural gas. I just can't make it happen.’”  
 While natural gas and other fossil fuels continued their expensive presence in the country, 
in Minnesota and elsewhere there were cries for deregulation. Following larger energy industry and 
national general trends toward merger and diversification through economies-of-scope, the electric 
cooperatives began to experiment in product offerings, side-businesses, partially to stave off the 
uncertainty of retail choice in the electricity industry in general. Cooperative Power Association and 
Dairyland, for instance, formed a joint energy marketing venture called GENSYS, joining their 
supply-side activities together and even filing a joint-integrated resource plan with the Minnesota 




merged with UPA, forming Great River Energy in 1999, effectively doubling their utility and load 
management program size and, according to one interviewee, increasing their load factor (Figure 
4.4). 
 
Figure 4.4: UPA’s Load Management Device Totals, Before and After the Merger with CPA. 
UPA’s program focused in the early years on water heaters and dual fuel systems but grew a 
formidable cycling air conditioner program as the utility turned summer peaking in the 1980s. After 
joining CPA in merger in 1999, the utility’s customer base and load management program doubled. 
Note that dual fuel and air conditioning are grouped together in 2004, an anomaly of the utility’s 
own filing method. Source: Great River Energy integrated resource plan filings with the Minnesota 
Public Utilities Commission and (Connett, 1996; EcoMotion, 1993). 
 
 
 Economy-wide, coming into the 1990s was a more stable time than what the electric 
cooperatives saw in the ‘70s, although rural areas still saw less productivity growth in general as 
compared to metro areas (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 1997). Commercial and industrial 
loads were coming to these mostly residential cooperatives, especially within the smaller counties, 
who finally saw some diversification of their loads, but for the most part, growth was fell short of the 
productivity, wages, and population growth of cities.  
It was also becoming clear by the ‘90s, and even by the ‘80s, that electric utilities were only 
one set of players in the new utility industry. Independent power producers, retail marketers, 




best to run the industry (Richard. F. Hirsh, 1999). Additional shifts in economics forced distribution  
and G&T cooperatives (such as UPA and CPA) to merge (Hexom, 2000). Competition ruled some 
of the thought around load management, too, as one interviewee described it as “customer choice” 
before customer choice had arrived. 
 
4.2.2. Market Formation 
 The Mid-Continent Area Power Pool (MAPP) – or in the case of East River, its power 
providers of Basin and the Western Area Power Administration – created the overarching market 
policies for three out of the four load management programs. These entities’ constitutional or meta-
constitutional market rules, as Ostrom (1990) writes, often set the tone for what cooperatives could 
do after they supplied their primary demand. In Minnkota, reduced capacity requirements from dual 
fuel usage during peak times meant they could sell their capacity surplus at a profit – in a single 
winter in 1978, this amounted to $600,000 for 30 megawatts, or $20 per kilowatt, when they had 
only spent the equivalent of $55 per kilowatt of dual fuel control at the outset. (Capehart, n.d.). 
Aggregating its member cooperatives’ interest, Minnkota aligned the MAPP market partners to 
make these off-peak electricity sales possible between wholesale market members. This change 
thereby allowed G&Ts like Minnkota to fully pass through off-peak rates to member co-ops, who 
then could pass-through rates to their member-owners (Minnkota Power Cooperative, Inc., 1995). 
As MAPP also required a reserve margin, it is within the ‘80s that cooperatives began to focus on 
clipping their peak in order to reduce that reserve capacity needed to operate and market within 
MAPP (Connett, 1996). 
 Within G&T systems, member cooperatives formed rate and marketing committees to help 
hash out details on specific offerings or rate designs. Most G&Ts also hired rate consultants to be 
used by member cooperatives. While some systems, such as UPA’s or Dairyland’s, allowed their 
member utilities to offer whatever rates for off-peak or peak shaving programs they wanted, East 




down pressure on member utilities. This was an intentional scheme on East River’s part: it hinged 
on farmers’ social networks, their appreciation of transparency, and their innate ability to compare 
deals with each other. The most notable uniform rate of East River’s was their $6-per-month rebate 
on the electric water heater, which was adopted by two-thirds of the East River membership. Some 
offered more than $6, some less, says Jeff Nelson, and some didn’t offer it at all. These differences 
allowed the rates to be locally tailored and appropriated, and while the G&T could coordinate prices 
and rates to the extent allowed by federal antitrust rules, they seldom interfered with the distribution 
utility and their member-owners, showing distinct boundaries in common pool duties and 
responsibilities.  
 In developing rates, the distribution cooperatives also were piloting new programs, making 
some mistakes and improvements with each other. Minnkota tested out control of stoves, and East 
River did the same to worse ends, recalling a fatefully cold holiday season when turkeys emerged 
from stoves uncooked. Televisions were also tested as managed devices. From these and other 
demand-side applications, the cooperatives generally found pairings with other conservation 
offerings such as compact-fluorescent light bulbs and insulation. Pairing conservation and load 
management improvements together, the co-ops found they could ease strain on installation 
practices for member-owners and increase acceptance and adoption among member-owners. 
 Amid increasing natural gas penetration in rural areas, and fossil fuel usage in general, it 
became necessary to retain current electric customers while also encouraging new electrification 
projects. Older electrified loads were being abandoned, literally cobwebbed in houses, while new 
heating units were installed. To that end, East River first rolled out dual fuel and all-home heat 
storage systems in the late ‘80s, investing more than $10 million in rolling out the programs. 
Other cooperatives formed side ventures to help smooth out business prospects for project 
partners. For UPA, the partner was Steffes – prior a North Dakotan manufacturer of oaken church 
pews – who joined UPA on its Department of Energy grant. That opportunity allowed Steffes to shift 




cooperatives. Yet these products were composed of heavy, dense materials such as bricks, and 
with no market yet for it on a regional or national scale, there was no distributor who would handle 
it. UPA filled the gap, warehousing the products and delivering them to member cooperatives on a 
biweekly basis. Filling a similar gap in the workforce, a South Dakotan electric cooperative reported 
hiring their own HVAC staff to help serve the western portion of their service area, where there 
were no qualified contractors. These HVAC personnel even worked with non-cooperative 
members, a sign of the co-op intermediating in larger economic needs in the area. Dairyland 
undertook the contract for managing Northern States Power – Wisconsin’s load management 
program through its own radio system. 
 Pilot projects like the above were common in other utilities, as well. Cass County Electric 
Cooperative reported on-going tests of equipment that might be compatible with the load 
management receiver, including “dual heating options for mobile homes, liquid and solids material 
storage devices, outdoor fuel-fired heating systems for secondary peaking energy, computerized 
load control equipment without a back-up energy source and alternative energy options that may 
include wind and solar mixed with off-peak energy” (Gustafson, 1981). Operational characteristics 
were also continually tested in home subdivisions. While consumer acceptance overall increased 
over time, even some market saturation points were beginning to be felt: not even within a decade 
of its program beginning, Minnkota’s daily load factor on a January day in the early 1980s was 
above 90 percent thanks to prodigious levels of dual fuel and electric heating. That left a lacking 
annual load factor, as summer days’ peak load was much less than winter days’ (Nelson, 1981a). 
This helps clarify the multiple goals of load factor management, which remained (and remains) a 
temporal consideration, a balancing of daily, seasonal, and yearly needs as much as individual and 





4.2.3. Resource Mobilization 
Education and coordination were absolute necessities for the programs. They were also 
albeit marked shifts in utility activities. “Utilities traditionally haven't had to network with HVAC 
contractors or electricians,” says Connett. “For years at UPA, [we would] build power plants or 
transmission lines to handle whatever's out there.” The shift moved them to interact with their 
customers and contractor base in a way that allowed the users of the common pool resource to 
become producers, either of valuable off-peak sales or peak-shaving capacity at the member-
owner level, or of the installation and product provisioning services at the contractor and co-op 
levels, so necessary to maintain growth and the usefulness of the load management system overall. 
Perhaps the first hurdle was understanding the real costs of education. One explicit case 
paints the picture: of the $80 it took to install each receiver switch, $55 was used to account for 
promotion and making customer contracts. While a seemingly large amount, $55 was little 
compared to the value of the dual fuel loads. These costs would decrease, too, as penetration 
levels increased, following earlier REA notions of “area coverage” (Energy Utilization Systems, Inc., 
1982).  
Distribution cooperatives, in general throughout the interviewees and public documents, 
reported spending much of their outreach efforts on annual meetings, monthly board member 
district meetings, monthly member-owner newsletters, radio, TV, and newspaper advertising. While 
some interviewees stressed the importance of pooling these activities through funds or money at 
the G&T, it’s also clear that each distribution cooperative ran an adjacent education and marketing 
campaign, showing important polycentricity that allowed them to deploy in the fashion most 
preferred to them. One electric cooperative, one of the tiniest in the nation at the time with under 
1,000 member-owners, even went door-to-door to persuade customers to take up the program. Its 
former manager estimates that more than two-thirds of its member-owners took up a controllable 
water heater, suggesting (as with Figure 4.3) that the size and institutional connectedness of a 




Because the G&Ts often had no direct contact with customers, they often interacted with 
third parties such as electricians and plumbers to sell and pitch load management, while distribution 
cooperatives performed more localized intermediary functions. Cass County Electric Cooperative 
wrote in 1980 that the response to the new program was terrible, that “many contractors responded 
by indicating that it simply would not work” (Gustafson, 1981). The cooperative pressed on with 
Minnkota and the North Dakota Continuing Education Department, making a series of classes 
highlighting the technology and its vagaries and proper installation techniques.  
Eventually, following some reports of poor installations, Minnkota’s program would grow in 
1987 into the Guaranteed Heating Program. Here Minnkota certified installers and guaranteed 
certain manufacturers’ products, a rarity for electric utilities on behalf of manufacturers. Shortly 
after, the program morphed into the Professional Contractors’ Program, providing educational 
tracks and certification programs to electrical, HVAC, and building contractors to more than 300 
contractors, students, product distributors, and cooperative personnel on an annual basis (Northern 
Municipal Power Agency, 2002). These trainings would give vendors a chance to sell products 
while simultaneously accrediting contractors with classes necessary for state licensure and putting 
them on Minnkota’s list of preferred contractors. Minnkota also apparently coordinated with 
manufacturers such as Steffes and Electro Industries to set up product trainings and schools for 
regional contractors.  
At UPA, the education process meant two-and-a-half-day contractor training sessions 
every year in the Twin Cities, paying the contractors for room and board to come and hear 
manufacturers talk about their products and listen to the cooperatives as they troubleshooted 
technological and installation issues. In their polycentric schemes, other UPA and CPA member 
cooperatives followed the G&Ts with coordination efforts of their own with more locally focused 
efforts, often making referral lists of contractors. These distribution cooperative contractor offerings 
often formed along the distinct boundary that they placed between their and the G&T services. For 




GRE would even provide their own staff to help train cooperative workers and contractors, but they 
had to be asked, signaling the voluntary nature of contributions within this common pool resource. 
There was plenty of work for other types of contractors and business, too. UPA, in the early 
days, had to retrofit smaller 40-gallon water heaters with a second tank, such that the load 
management program could better bank kilowatt-hours for off-peak usage and leave the bathwater 
warm and plentiful. They engaged plumbers for years on this duplicative task, until manufacturers 
saw the promise of the water heating market and manufactured oversized residential water heaters 
between 80 to 120 gallons. With a location in the Twin Cities, Marathon provided a plastic-cased 
water heater that never rusted, serving the cooperatives well until the company was bought out. It 
moved south, and from that manufacturing facility many shipments of leaky, faulty water heaters 
came for the co-ops. This supply chain issue was largely handled by UPA as it sought other 
manufacturer partners, a common supply chain intermediary function for the G&T in the early days 
of the CPR. 
Other issues with manufacturers were negotiated in the early days mostly by G&Ts. One 
of the first was that other manufacturers had to be lined up for products. The task could be daunting: 
European manufacturers were ahead of their American counterparts, and there was often no local 
or easily accessible load management product for the electric cooperatives’ member-owners 
(Gustafson, 1981). Often it took time for the manufacturers to respond to national market conditions 
and pent-up demand from other utilities. This left cooperatives like Minnkota to rely on more 
regional manufacturers such as Minnesota-based Electro Industries, who were used for their dual 
fuel and heat storage systems (Electro Industries, 2014).  
For individual gains and resources, the distribution cooperatives who had prior to the 
creation of the G&T load management programs incentivized water heaters and other electrified 
loads, now had a head start on the utilities in the system. The “friendly competition,” as Thorson 




distribution cooperatives, more than 10,000 water heaters were installed before the program was 
even started in 1980 (Figure 4.5). 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Cumulative Number (Line) and Winter Peak Reduction Kilowatts (Columns) of 
Load Management Devices at Dairyland Power Cooperative, 1980-2000. Dairyland’s program 
began in 1982 with more than 10,000 devices, mostly water heaters, already equipped with 
receivers. These were “installed over the past 20 years,” as Dairyland’s REA loan application said, 
suggesting distribution cooperatives doing much of the work with their own communication systems 
beforehand. From 1980, over the next three years, the number of water heaters either installed or 
retrofitted increased by more than 20,000. By 2000, the amount of water heaters within Dairyland’s 
system was at 80,000. Meanwhile, 16,000 dual fuel systems, 5,000 heat storage, and other C&I 
loads were also installed. Data sources: Dairyland Power Cooperative’s integrated resource plan 
filings with the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission and (Dairyland Power Cooperative, 1985). 
Black line estimate gain in cumulative number of devices between 1983 and 2000. 
 
 
4.2.4. Legitimation with Local Provisioning and Collective Choice 
 While G&Ts initiated programs, it didn’t necessarily mean that their distribution 
cooperatives took advantage of the new platform or that G&Ts promoted it to their member 
cooperatives strongly. CPA cooperatives, for instance, were mentioned as not having much of a 
program at all until the late ‘80s, almost a full decade past its creation. Dakota Electric’s program, 




irrigation and dual fuel for kilowatt impact, and a smaller year-on-year uptake of 20 new devices in 
other programs, all despite Dakota’s presence as the largest cooperative in the CPA system 
(Dakota Electric Association, 1987, 2014; Doyle, 1979).  
The cooperative, the only in Minnesota to be rate regulated by the state utilities 
commission, cited their lack of off-peak rates from the G&T as part of the problem. “[A]t 3.6 cents 
a kilowatt-hour,” the cooperative wrote, “we cannot compete with natural gas or propane. Reduce 
that number by a four-mill credit to 3.2 cents, and we still cannot compete.”  Yet the 0.4 cent per 
kilowatt-hour rate was still  voted- and agreed-upon at CPA in 1986, along with the allowance in 
the new rate of heat storage and dual fuel systems. In addition to these changes, less-than-80-
gallon water heaters were now allowed in programs, or as determined by individual cooperatives. 
These year-to-year, trial-and-error calculations in program design – like those reported in 
the common pool resource managements of Ostrom (1990) – seemed common for the 
cooperatives, allowing for at least some collective determination, via boards at the distribution and 
G&T levels, of program modifications. One interviewee said it took nearly ten years to sort through 
all the programmatic changes. Through committees organized at the G&T level, additional 
opportunities for staff to mix and exchange program designs occurred. Member services 
representatives across the distribution cooperatives would meet often to talk about how to handle 
paper work, but also to share ideas on program management. Some program shifts came from the 
bottom-up: some interviewees at distribution cooperatives reported holding training sessions with 
electricians wherein they would discuss with electrical inspectors what to present on. With electrical 
inspectors, they formed an informal governance of supervisors and educators to area electricians, 
setting best practices or informal standards for installations. But getting in the door with these and 
other contractors could be tricky. Outstanding commitments from contractors to certain 
manufacturers or distributors sometimes meant backlogs of non-utility approved load management 




The cooperatives had to offer a “win-win” to contractors. This became the increased 
business opportunity from the cooperative, since electrified loads often paid more on a job basis 
than any gas installation. The jobs could be at least sometimes negotiated, such that each 
contractor on a cooperative’s preferred list of contractors would be apportioned a slice of work from 
the occasional request-for-proposals. With building contractors, too, cooperatives sought to 
ingratiate themselves, working specifically so that new developments of hundreds of houses would 
all have controllable water heaters or air conditioning units. These new house builds were cited in 
multiple interviews as a key point in which the cooperative mediated the adoption process for 
consumers and contractors. 
Closer to the G&T level, organizational differences between the G&Ts became more 
pronounced as time went on. In contrast to CPA’s deferral of an off-peak rate, UPA and Minnkota 
had allowed an off-peak rate from the beginning to their member cooperatives (EcoMotion, 1993; 
Energy Utilization Systems, Inc., 1982). UPA additionally offered loans to member cooperatives so 
that they could, in turn, offer loans to their member cooperatives. These types of financing decisions 
and optionality were important, as the G&Ts’ involvement once again didn’t mean strict 
implementation of load management. It meant something bigger: trust. This was a facet that 
Minnkota seemed prescient of when its board of directors “strongly urge[d]” member utilities to 
adopt policies to encourage dual fuel systems along with a “a publicity program” for those policies 
(Nelson, 1981b). There was no centralized control, other than in their physical communications 
systems: everything else was left to the distribution cooperative. 
Basin Electric Power Cooperative also allowed an off-peak rate to its other G&T member 
cooperatives, but only after a conflict with East River, whose dual fuel and electric room heat 
programs were becoming too well-deployed for Basin’s other member G&Ts. Those other G&T 
member co-ops, whose load factor sometimes topped 70 percent due to the presence of coal 
mining and other heavy industries, complained that East River’s load management successes was 




another member G&Ts too rapidly, cross-subsidizing too noticeably. The math came down to a 
demand and energy charge, where the crossover point of load factor (where East River would start 
shifting costs onto other member G&Ts, hypothetically) was 57 percent, according to Jeff Nelson. 
For years prior, East River had existed at 40 percent, but now as they neared 60 percent coming 
in the ‘90s, they were told to end their dual fuel and electric room heat programs. That decision 
alone stranded more than $10 million in startup costs. “I just said to them, ‘So then I guess we 
should've been mad at the system that had 70 percent because they didn't have to do a damn 
thing,” says Jeff Nelson. 
East River acquiesced, the result a rare top-down interference with the common pool 
resources of these load management programs. To be on the losing end of a battle was painful for 
East River, because while it had the same winners-and-losers result of all load management efforts 
between member cooperatives of other G&T systems, this one ended explicitly-successful 
programs.  
East River’s experience with Basin was unique among this study’s participants, showing a 
G&T that could not align with meta-constitutional rules of its power supplier with the common pool 
resource at the distribution level. Yet East River, and many other utilities, had other successes 
aligning rules with in its other power supplier, WAPA. The utility helped organize hundreds of other 
utilities to renegotiate their contract, which was based on a percentage of an annual peak, to a 
fixed, monthly allocation. Intermediating in the process, East River helped facilitate a change that 
was deemed better for the great majority’s stake in the common pool, although a few were left with 
the option to retain the old contract, following a trend of voluntary contribution/non-contribution 
throughout the levels of the electric grid.  
Like East River’s power supply intermediation with WAPA, the fix to allow off-peak sales in 
MAPP was facilitated by Minnkota. Ultimately, the cooperative had to convince everyone in its 
special MAPP committee that it “may not be the best individually, but good for the pool,” says Mel 




Nelson and the others on the committee were successful in passing a rule that Northern States 
Power, owner of the most votes in MAPP, could agree to.  
The constitutional and meta-constitutional rules of the commons’ power supply thus had to 
be changed to legitimate the load management technology innovation at the bottom. G&Ts 
aggregated the interests of their member utilities to help work out supply-side incongruencies, while 
at the bottom, distribution cooperatives tried to fairly align prices and consumers’ perceptions of 
them. It was important once again to the distribution co-ops and the G&Ts administering off-peak 
rates or annual demand charges, to allow the distribution utilities to offer what was locally legitimate, 
following Ostrom’s precept of local benefits being proportionate to local costs. Some of Minnkota’s 
distribution cooperatives, for instance, chose to offer low-interest loans and a 1 cent-per-kilowatt-
hour discount for dual fuel systems; some went the opposite direction, not allowing new electric 
heating from their member-owners unless it was controlled (Energy Utilization Systems, Inc., 1982). 
Over the following decades, an diverse number of financing and rate options developed across 
member cooperatives and between their programs, combining financing from the G&Ts, local and 
regional finance institutions, and the distribution cooperatives themselves (Connett, 2001). 
As addressed in the formation period of these programs, G&T systems took great care to 
address these concerns of fairness in how they operated and marketed their programs. East River 
reports their control strategy is redetermined annually, and takes into account “benefit in proportion 
to the number of receivers installed” at the member cooperatives (Holt, 2007). One interviewee, 
working in the East River network, said they declined to use the uniform $6/month credit for water 
heaters that Jeff Nelson said was most popular. He explained their rationale:  
It didn't make sense to install it and for us to try and save on the program and then 
to turn around and give them 6 dollars. Because it came 6 dollars on our revenue, 
[and] that ends up as an expense to us. This is to help in the energy rate and 
everybody will benefit from it… [and] once you give the six dollars, you'll never be 
able to take it away. 
 
Yet other rates were designed with the understanding there was more at play than just a 




slip-up meant the farmer couldn’t pay their backer, as one interviewee stated. Yet each offered a 
large reward in kilowatts clipped, and were highly sought-after customers in both UPA, CPA, and 
East River. The process to enroll these customers and control their loads was often highly 
negotiated. East River relied on South Dakota State University’s (SDSU) irrigation specialist to 
introduce them to farmers, relying on the networks of the Farm Bureau, the Farmers Union, and 
the Dairy Association to build trust with farmers. With SDSU, the irrigation specialists also worked 
with farmers simultaneously to reform their overwatering practices. 
To allow for flexibility with their individual member-owner requirements with these large 
loads, some allowed farmers to bypass the control. For East River, auto-restart features were 
installed on irrigation receivers to allow a farmer the freedom to not manually restart the receiver 
on his irrigator at 11 at night. In all, the process of engaging with irrigators was a process that would 
take them from farm to farm, even working with farmers to help monitor their peers who might 
unfairly bypass their load management receiver to receive credits without controlling, signaling a 
manner of common pool resource enforcement by the users of that resource. 
The commercial and industrial interruptible loads were the most negotiated, as their 
operations had perhaps the most to lose from a slip-up. As such, these were by-and-large 
bypassable controls, giving the business the option to ride out a high demand charge, often passed 
through straight from the G&T, or shut down parts of or all the business. The shut-downs were not 
trivial for Dairyland C&I loads: a chipboard production facility had time-sensitive products whose 
parts could start on fire if left unset, and plastics manufacturers might have to deal with hardened 
gunk of plastics on their machines for a day after. Considering this, commercial and industrial loads 
often chose to manage their own energy usage without utility involvement, though member 
cooperative incentives could often persuade them into common pool resource involvement. 
In total, for any type of member-owner, utility-controlled load management programs were 
thought to be more operationally flexible to their needs, be they hot water or interruptible 




burdening consumers with too many decisions and actions (see Table 2.2 for more information on 
time-of-use rates). Yet shared benefits were often worth the risks of load management. For the 
utility, too, a portfolio of utility-controlled load management products provided a backstop to other 
voluntary customer load reductions. In this portfolio, the co-ops could trust the aggregate effect of 
certain technologies such as water heaters, which one interviewee called the “baseload” capacity 
for the entire peak and off-peak performance of the load management system. Baseload supply, 
apparently, can have baseload demand. 
Because the programs were coordinated and largely created through the G&T, a sense of 
ownership of the program eventually came to the distribution cooperatives. This incorporated in the 
long-run even the laggards, who took sometimes two decades of common pool resource integration 
to become proponents of the G&T-led system, according to Jeff Nelson:  
Letting guys like myself and many others trying to make the system operate, to try 
to get customers to participate, to explain why they had to change their rates, to 
report on the number of end customers who complained about the system and the 
number of operations were just not working… [It] changed the thinking of that old 
social contract into a new social contract. 
 
 Interestingly, state regulations sometimes affected the co-ops, who sought to change them 
to help protect, in part, their load management programs. Advocacy groups and state officials 
began to show concern over perceived wasteful practices of electrification through load 
management (Engelking, 1995). Their worries would eventually become integrated into 
Minnesota’s Conservation Improvement Program (CIP). The initial rule allowed energy efficiency, 
system efficiency improvements, and load management to count toward spending and efficiency 
mandates, creating a situation where more than 80 percent of expenditures were for load 
management (Minnesota Department of Public Service, 1992).   The allowance of spending for 
load management in the program would be later renegotiated in 2001, limiting the allowances of 
load management practices toward CIP’s mandate (Minnesota Municipal Utilities Association, 
2002). In 2007, when the standard was renegotiated again, system efficiency credits, such as 




linking to the practices and philosophies that created the load management programs in the first 
place (Minnesota Center for Energy and Environment, Optimal Energy, & Seventhwave, 2018).  
The co-ops were mentioned in an interview as having successfully negotiated load 
management into the CIP over time, citing system efficiency (via load factor increases, for example) 
as the main goal rather than an energy conservation specifically. These changes are important 
because they show cooperatives effectively negotiating common pool resource constitutional rules 
as they pertained to state regulations. This could also be taken as an example of the electric grid’s 
larger network of polycentric actors negotiating a rule that acknowledged individual co-op 
institutional agency, while combining aspects of privatization (for energy efficiency credits) and top-
down management (the Conservation Improvement Program was a mandate). Here the 
intermediary functions that G&Ts performed on behalf of their distribution cooperatives, legitimating 
their programs to wider political interests, showed nested institutions changing what, on the surface, 
might otherwise appear to be a straightforward government mandate. 
 
4.3. 2000s to Present: Re-creation 
 
4.3.1. Regime and Landscape Interactions 
 Nascent in the 1980s, but coming into mainstream in the 1990s and 2000s, two-way, 
digitalized technology spread through the utility world, bringing with it advanced metering and real-
time pricing opportunities, but also new system weaknesses in cybersecurity (Pérez-Arriaga & 
Knittel, 2016). Most interviewees reported the change as being monumental to the future of load 
management programs. Many interviewees held load management in question now not around its 
presence, but around its overall usage with wholesale markets such as the Midcontinent 
Independent System Operator (MISO).  
 With new wind and solar rapidly declining in costs, and natural gas flooding the market with 




economic changes were occurring fast for the cooperatives. Yet by the recession, which had 
crashed at least a few cooperatives’ methods of selling load management through new home 
builds, energy sales again flattened. Only a decade later did they begin to rise (Gahran, 2018). In 
this time, too, growth in global climate change mitigation efforts and damages, along with increasing 
interconnectedness of electric grids with each other and cheaper renewable sources of generation, 
increasingly drove electric utilities and policymakers toward decarbonized energy solutions. This 
occurred even as locations, such as Minnesota, stalled in their emission reduction goals (Minnesota 
Pollution Control Agency, 2019; Pérez-Arriaga & Knittel, 2016). 
In the Midwest, fossil fuel heating regimes (involving natural gas, propane, and fuel oil), 
combined with cheaper gas supplies, spread into the more urban and suburban centers, still not 
fully penetrating the rural areas. In Minnesota, for example, electricity still provided upwards of 30 
percent of heat for residential units as of 2014 (Figure 4.6), while natural gas provided upward of 
70 percent of heating for many counties centered around the Twin Cities and into southern 
Minnesota. Over the past decade, close to 100,000 residential units gained electric heat, mostly in 









Figure 4.6: Percent of Housing Units Using Electricity as a Heating Fuel, 2010-2014. 
Metropolitan counties experienced much higher natural gas penetration than the rural counties, 
which still used high percentages of propane, fuel oil, and wood to heat their homes. The most 
electrified heating sources, according to the map, coincide with western and northern Minnesota, 
an intersection of this study’s G&T subjects. The highest penetrations appear to occur within 
Minnkota’s territory, perhaps speaking to the pervasiveness of their dual-fuel approach. Adopted 
from (Eleff, 2017), who used U.S. Census Bureau American Community Survey 5-year estimates. 
 
 
4.3.2. Market Formation 
 “We have a foot in the new world and that's MISO,” says Connett, “and meanwhile the 
way we recover our costs is old world.”  
In an older world, as Connett says, the distribution cooperative was tied to the G&T 
through an all-requirements contract. The G&T provided all energy and capacity to the co-op and 
hedged what they didn’t need through the collective organization of MAPP. Yet the advent of 
MISO and other independent system operators under the regulation of the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Agency, along with the growing economic feasibility of distributed generation, opened 




capacity or reserves but could also an energy service at the constitutional level of the commons 
at MISO. The load management that was above a certain capacity and met certain reliability 
requirements – mostly customer-owned generators and interruptible commercial and industrial 
accounts – was able to participate in MISO or other wholesale energy markets, with the G&T 
acting as aggregator for the member-owner or member cooperative. Yet for water heaters and 
other too-small distributed assets, load management operated behind-the-meter from MISO, 
meaning the market did not control or detect these assets. As such, in Dairyland, when peak 
conditions started to hit, that meant turning off water heaters to decrease price exposure (PLMA 
Thought Leadership Group, 2019). It remained apparent to G&Ts like GRE, despite this 
incongruency in distribution and wholesale, that the wholesale market could provide benefit: one 
document citing GRE said the utility could receive the same value for 12 hours of load control in 
MISO that it would have taken 160 hours to make without it (Power Systems Engineering, Inc., 
2017) 
While there were potential benefits, wholesale markets also brought new uncertainty for 
distribution cooperatives outside those contracts and centralized rate structures. They could 
recover their system costs all the same from distribution utility members, but now the peak of 
MISO – and not the collective peak demand of the co-ops – was the uniting system goal. G&Ts 
now experienced what their distribution cooperatives felt in the 1970s and ‘80s with the advent of 
their G&T-system coincident peaking rates. 
 Despite these top-down interferences, the old co-op system remained perpetuated in the 
contracts that G&Ts carried with distribution cooperatives. Member cooperatives were still 
rewarded proportionately for the demand charges they avoided, and G&Ts were still largely able 
to control member-owner loads, or at least the one-way receivers that still worked. According to 
one report of Arrowhead Electric Cooperative, as many as half of load management receivers 




Without heavy market intermediation or ability to intermediate by the G&T for these 
distributed assets, individual utilities began in this time to exert intermediary market-shaping 
forces on their own with new technological vendors. Cooperatives such as Connexus Energy and 
Minnesota Valley Electric Cooperative began to offer voluntary demand response programs with 
smart thermostats outside GRE’s control. Other co-op piloting of programs continued. 
Interviewees reported electric vehicle rates and test drives at events such as annual meetings. 
Grid-interactive, digital water heaters were also mentioned in multiple interviews as being tested 
in reaction to wholesale price signals. In unique partnerships among a few Dairyland member co-
ops, behind-the-meter control of batteries were also tested, placed within member-owner homes 
to determine overall feasibility with a time-of-use rate (Uhlenhuth, 2019).  
These pilots and individual or sub-group efforts seemed localized, however, and not the 
norm. It may have been that here, as in the 1970s with time clocks and power line carrier, 
individual cooperatives with the resources acted to experiment, while those without the internal 
capacity fell behind, waiting for the next wave of G&T intermediation to carry them forward in the 
common pool of collective goals. 
 
4.3.3. Resource Mobilization 
G&T and distribution utilities faced in the 2000s more overarching questions on where 
and how to redevelop their load management communication infrastructure. For example, 
following the merger, GRE moved to consolidate the separate load management programs of 
CPA and UPA. Materially, this meant investing in a master controller to control each system 
(Minnesota Power & Great River Energy, 2005). As a matter of governance, though, it meant 
signaling to member utilities when to operate their own load management systems (instead of 
directly controlling) and building for co-op to co-op interoperability on the grid. As some 
interviewed co-ops had built their own control centers for their grids in the past, load management 




resources, with many distribution utilities and G&Ts accommodating increasing numbers of third 
parties into their digitalized grids. GRE, for instance, moving toward increasing amounts of two-
way technologies, saw upward of a dozen of member co-op communication vendors in the 
system, while scores of other co-ops showed non-adoption of the same vendors and technologies 
(Figure 4.7).  
 
Figure 4.7: The Diversity, Type, and Ownership of Great River Energy Member Cooperative 
Communication System Platforms. In its 2018-2032 Integrated Resource Plan filing to the 
Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, Great River Energy showed the scope of their “future grid” 
technologies, allowing them, in part, to “control electric loads at a more granular level and 
interconnect with other load control technologies.” Source: (Great River Energy, 2017). 
 
While some such as GRE sought to deploy and coordinate resources for a rebuild of an 
interoperable communication system infrastructure for their member utilities’ load management 
systems, other G&Ts such as Minnkota rebuilt their old, one-way ripple communications 
infrastructure (Minnkota Power Cooperative., 2017). Minnkota worked with Landis&Gyr and to 




control injectors. “We researched the possibility of replacing everything with a whole new 
program,” one Minnkota employee reported in the December 2017 Minnkota Messenger, “but 
there was overwhelming support to keep our existing system operating… All we did was 
purchase new injector hardware to replicate the same signals that the co-ops were getting in the 
past.” As another Minnkota employee reported in the same article, “Really all we’re doing is 
extending the life of a legacy system,” it seemed that the collective decision to rebuild or re-create 
the provisioning infrastructure was on many G&T systems’ minds, even as new individual 
opportunities emerged. 
This demand-side infrastructure decision reflected a development in the co-op world 
where in 2009 and the early 2010s, at least a few distribution cooperatives began to fix their all-
requirements contracts to a certain level of power supply, or seek exemptions for self-supply 
(Chan et al., 2019). With the new entry into MISO, these cooperatives also had to seek peaking 
contracts from other G&Ts. Those peaking contracts, with provisions for demand and energy, 
often meant that cooperatives would now be controlling for three or four peaks: physical 
distribution grid peaks, fixed contract peaks, peaking contract peaks, and wholesale market 
peaks. The new contractual arrangements had the side-effect of distancing the member utility 
from G&T aggregation abilities in marketing, information sharing in committees, or other 
programs. “We’re doing our own now,” said one interviewee with a peaking contract.  
The arrangements also shifted the financial fairness of the system: only 20 of the 28 GRE 
member cooperatives, those with all-requirements contracts, received rebates for demand-side 
management products from the G&T; the rest are solo (Power Systems Engineering, Inc., 2017). 
 Internal to the remaining common pool, the focus of the G&T remained at least somewhat 
on the distribution cooperatives. Education of these co-ops and their member-owners was never 
complete, as Thorson cited the constant turnover in member services’ personnel and the lack of 
experience from some board directors with the program. Other G&T interviewees talked of seeing 




member utilities received. They could provide more resources and incentives, collectively decided 
upon by different general manager-led committees, but there was also a saturation point for what 
any G&T could do for a distribution cooperative that had failed, after decades, to deploy 
measurable amounts of load management.  
 Looking beyond load management, the cooperatives increasingly tied their load factor to 
economic opportunities for businesses and community centers. Cooperatives remained overall 
residential-based, but their electricity became increasingly focused on commercial and industrial 
programs as manufacturing and large farms moved into the country. Layered benefits appeared 
to be on the cooperatives’ minds: one interviewee reported obtaining a federal loan through the 
Rural Economic Development Loan & Grant Program to update a hospital wing, using it to also 
implement a utility-controlled diesel genset to back up the hospital during peak or emergency 
conditions.  
To accommodate and take advantage of growing commercial and industrial loads, many 
programs during this time also endured a shift in focus, reflecting local preferences for load 
management from the distribution co-ops. For cooperatives such as East River and its member 
utilities, that meant shifting over time from its initial sprint of water heaters, which allowed them to 
remain afloat financially during the farm crisis, toward third-parties and summer-based loads like 
irrigation and customer-owned generators (Figure 4.8). These shifts gave them more kilowatt-
bang for the device-buck, even as water heaters performed backstop “baseload” duties in the 





Figure 4.8: Cumulative Number (Shaded Areas) and Kilowatts (Lines) of Load Management 
Devices at East River Electric Power Cooperative, 1984-2018. In the first two years of East 
River’s load management program, the collective of member cooperatives deployed more than 
20,000 water heaters and/or load management receivers. Water heater adoption rates after 
matched the linear path of air conditioning units, while just a few irrigation and customer-owned 
generator units were enough to make a large kilowatt impact. Note the dual fuel and room heat 
storage programs which ended in 1992 after a dispute with East River’s power supplier, Basin 
Electric Power Cooperative. Data source: Jeff Rud, East River Electric Power Cooperative. 
 
 
4.3.4. Legitimation with Local Provisioning and Collective Choice 
Technology and wholesale markets changed expectations for G&Ts and distribution 
utilities alike, along with their member-owners. “Smart thermostats were the first time we started to 
lose control of the control,” says Connett, reflecting the growing porousness in the boundaries of 
this common pool resource. Customers controlled their own loads more, and distribution utilities 
wrangled those loads as they could. And interoperability needs with increasing numbers of third 
parties meant communication systems had to be integrated at the distribution and G&T levels. 
While increasing in the number of actors and institutions, the complexity of the system, and the 




For instance, East River had made, installed, and maintained their hand-wired irrigation 
load management receivers for years (East River Electric Power Cooperative, 2018).  Incentivizing 
farmers to participate in a third-party irrigation management system, the G&T saw 161 farmers join 
in 2017, and more than 120 in 2018, showing a type of collective action with the facilitative 
intermediary of a non-cooperative unit. Echoing other interviewees, one interviewee from the East 
River system emphasized the growing optionality of the load management system: “We went to 
some load control devices that the member installs on their own system, but they can control from 
their iPhone. We send him a notice, and he can see if, ‘Is my pivot on or is it off and do I want to 
ride through the demand charges and run it because it's too hot or dry?’ It puts the decision in his 
hands rather than us deciding.”  
Giving up control meant more control, in a way, for the co-ops in this new age. Customer-
control, through time-of-use rates or customer notifications, was enabled now through metering 
technology and more advanced rate structures that weren’t efficient or technologically feasible in 
the 1970s. Unlike then, price functions with their optionality were mentioned to work just as well as 
load management.  
Increasing individual volition at the levels of the grid led to a growing sense in interviews of 
a new “tragedy of the commons.” While Dairyland is only a fraction of total peak in the market, if 
other utilities shed load or use distributed energy to offset peaks as they did, it can lead MISO’s 
peaks to be misforecast. And because that load was taken away from the system unexpectedly, it 
generated new real-time locational marginal prices, arguably affecting everyone for the worse. 
There were signs, however, that the system’s rules could be integrated top-to-bottom, as it was 
before: under a new docket from FERC, split off from FERC Order 841 on energy storage, new 
distributed energy resources aggregation rules at MISO meant the market could soon accept bids 
of aggregated DER from utilities like GRE (Kleckner, Kuser, Cook, Brooks, & Heidorn Jr., 2018). 




aggregation, bringing again some doubt as to the old commons-based program carrying into the 
new market-based role. 
 Other impacts from MISO influenced the cooperatives’ programs. Generated by influxes of 
geographically varied utilities and their diverse loads, longer peaks drove the cooperatives to divvy 
their load management assets into different geographic and temporal groupings, cycling water 
heaters to help hit what might be a six- or eight-hour window, a shift from the ‘80s and 90s when 
the peak only existed for a few hours. Economic growth also affected the programs: one interviewee 
cited the fact that peaky load growth outside the load management program almost negated the 
efforts of the controlled devices themselves.  
Hearkening to Insull in the early days of the grid, some utilities sought to entice high-load 
factor loads to the grid rather than wait for them. Jeff Nelson thought the Rural Electric Economic 
Development (REED) Fund, a strategic pooling of participating member cooperatives’ investments 
to loan out to attract new businesses to the area, was connected in a way to East River’s load 
management program. The REED Fund pooled resources and abilities similarly in the management 
and provision of common funds, but also like load management, there was a load factor connection. 
Loaning out $80 million dollars over its 20-year life, the collective of East River co-ops built stable, 
non-peaky load for the electric cooperative (East River Electric Power Cooperative, 2018). Due to 
the changing nature of their customer base, and partially due to direct influence from the G&T and 
distribution cooperative in drawing in new load, East River’s load management program didn’t need 
to clip peaks as increasingly through the years (Figure 4.9). Interestingly, building load here was 
just as legitimate as the load management itself, and facilitative activities pursued by most of the 
member cooperatives in the REED Fund allowed the process to occur more efficiently than if they 





Figure 4.9: 34 Years of Peak Load (Dark Area Below) and Clipped Peaks (Light Area Above) 
in January and August at East River Electric Power Cooperative, 1985-2018. Above shows 
East River’s winter peak rising faster than the summer, even as the clipped load in summer 
increased faster than winter. The reasons are due to commercial and industrial customers 
quadrupling their portion of East River’s total sales, pointing to a changing customer composition 
that has limited the amount of necessary load clipping from load management, at least in winter. 
Source: Jeff Rud, East River Electric Power Cooperative. 
 
Reflecting on the changing nature of their business, many interviewees wanted to know 
what to expect next. Some directly requested this study respond to that question, while other 
brainstormed on possible future options. One interviewee posited that the day was coming soon 
when the G&T didn’t just sell to the distribution utility but would also buy from it. No other 
interviewees echoed that statement, but their individual mentions of repurposing the load 
management programs for new uses – incorporating intermittent renewable energy, responding to 
wholesale market signals, and using electric vehicles and electrified appliances to grow load and 
remove reliance on fossil fuels – spoke to an overarching, regenerative phase for the programs in 
general. This was reflected in groups such as the Beneficial Electrification League (supported jointly 
by the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association and the Natural Resources Defense 
Council) that helped to legitimate the old load management technologies. With legislation posed in 




Program (Office of the Revisor of Statutes, 2019), some interviewees mentioned the necessity of 
the law’s change to include load growing activities. One interviewee mentioned their lobbying 
activities to legislators on behalf of the proposed legislation, signaling some of the system building 





I interpret these findings considering my theoretical framework on intermediaries, 
polycentricity, and energy transitions. Below I use technological innovation systems and the multi-
level perspective to draw out key theoretical insights on intermediaries, showing how intermediary 
functions may be necessary to DER deployment in general and how they shift throughout time 
between decentralized partners. I then focus on polycentricity to show the importance of 
intermediary innovation functions in distributed energy resource deployment. Finally, I state this 
own study’s caveats and some implications for future research ideas.  
5.1. Connecting Findings to Technological Innovation Systems 
Theory 
By highlighting the co-ops’ intermediary innovation functions in managing a common pool 
resource of electricity infrastructure, I showed a novel connection between TIS theory and 
polycentricity. Innovation for these utilities and their customers was a negotiated, political process, 
not just technological or economic in nature. It was also never a mandated or market-driven effort. 
It was instead a mutual involvement of incumbent electric cooperatives facilitating early adopters 
and laggards alike, while encouraging new nonutility actors with their own intermediary innovation 
functions that changed through the phases of load management deployment. Innovation occurred 
here through multiple layers of competition and cooperation, showing that the TIS can be more 




From these observations, I am led to the conclusion that the general process of a 
distributed energy deployment – controlling or incentivizing multiple, different loads at once with 
multiple, different utilities and customers – needs layers of formal and informal polycentric 
governance. By facilitating multiple nodes of difference and experience, the distributed energy 
resource deployment was able to emerge and sustain itself. Whether for a particularly quick 
deployment, such as East River’s nearly-30,000 water heaters in three years (see Figure 4.8), or a 
sustained deployment (such as occurred within all the programs), intermediary innovation functions 
seem to have been completely necessary. This conclusion is important because while research 
has only begun to show the importance of politics and governance within electricity and energy, it 
is my hope that this study will spawn more studies and practical models on locally-relevant 
innovation intermediation functions in the future.  
For the sake of transitions theory alone, this study shows the TIS can be a collaborative, 
political process between layers of cooperating and competing actors and institutions. These 
geographically dispersed and -dependent utilities often worked outside of strict market or top-down 
regulation mindsets. For instance, cross-subsidy was often accepted (against ideas of efficient 
markets), and local differences were often embraced (against ideas of mandates driving minimum 
performance), as intermediary functions of the co-ops helped to shape networks of deployment and 
adoption. These intermediary functions showed at all levels of the commons: through the 
governance and markets of MAPP or MISO (Sections 4.2.4 or 4.3.2); in the marketing committees, 
manufacturer networking, and co-created rate structures of the G&Ts (Sections 4.1 and 4.2); in the 
incentives and contractor networking of the distribution utilities, with offers of help from G&Ts 
(Section 4.2.3); and in the technological adoptions and utility-customer collaborations of the 
member-owners (Sections 4.1.2, 4.2.2, and 4.3.2). Because these functions occurred at all levels, 
it seems relevant that the TIS should reflect the multi-scalar nature of innovation and not contain 




a heavy focus on individual customer adoption trends, and on utility-by-utility programmatic efforts, 
but less on the complete top-to-bottom context of these trends and cumulative efforts.  
Following the results of this study, these individual adoption trends of DERs should be 
recognized as constructed by greater systemic institutional and social forces. These forces are not 
of singular actors: they flow between actors, as shown by this study’s focus on intermediary 
innovation functions. This mirrors previous research on decentralized resource management that 
showed that a polycentric analyst must look “beyond the performance of a local government unit 
to consider the relationships among governance actors, problems, and institutional arrangements 
at different levels of governance” (Andersson & Ostrom, 2008). Adoption and deployment of DERs, 
in this case load management, were less about individual actors than the connections between 
them. Locally-relevant adoptions of DERs, whether they were water heaters or grain dryers, 
seemed to be the results of numerous ties and fostering of ties by actors and institutions. The 
connections between actors, problems, and institutions formed a complete DER deployment 
innovation system that existed through experimentation and learning, as Andersson and Ostrom 
(2008) similarly found.  
As with the notion of “system building” in the TIS, where actors deliberately create 
supportive structures for innovation even if it doesn’t directly benefit them, the co-ops’ intermediary 
functions had a substantial impact on the continued deployment of distributed energy resources 
(Musiolik & Markard, 2011; Musiolik, Markard, Hekkert, & Furrer, 2018). Appearing to follow design 
principles of common pool resources, the instances in which programs failed to grow are 
noteworthy: they are cases of outside interference or lack of intermediation. East River’s electric 
heat programs were ended by Basin’s other member G&Ts when they became too “successful,” 
and Minnesota Valley Cooperative Light & Power never started a program, perhaps for lack of 
involvement from Basin. Other programs’ stunted growth often came from a mismatch with local 
conditions or failure to coordinate value through the chains of the system (i.e. Dakota Electric and 




off-peak rates in MAPP in Section 4.2.4). With the many other examples of program successes for 
the co-ops, the above failures demonstrate just how important cooperation and facilitative regime 
and system goals are to distributed energy deployments. 
5.2. Connecting Findings to the Multi-level Perspective of 
Intermediaries 
By showing the iterations of intermediary functions over phases, I also showed how 
polycentric decision processes overcame potential barriers through cumulative, collective action 
across all levels of the governance of the common pool resource. In these actions the co-ops drove 
niche innovations into their regimes and bridged gaps between the layers that might have hindered 
deployment. This provides insight into the MLP, which largely focuses on individual attainment and 
innovation, and shows that niche, incumbent, and systemic intermediaries may be necessary to 
move innovations into incumbent regimes. This follows Andersson and Ostrom (2008) who suggest 
“the key to effective governance arrangements lies in the relationships among actors who have a 
stake in the governance of the resource.” Likewise, DER deployment may require strengthening of 
relationships to move innovations upward to different regime levels. 
Importantly, the intermediary and bridging roles of the G&Ts and distribution utilities shifted 
throughout the time-periods, following Markard’s (2018) conception of life cycles for TIS 
frameworks. This is important for the MLP because it shows that upward pressures for niche 
innovations may need to change as time goes on. For instance, in the formation stages, centralized 
incumbents in the G&Ts played a large role in resource deployment and market formation, giving 
central coordination and legitimation to what would have been too decentralized, too divisive to 
carry in an individual fashion. As one interviewee said: 
By East River coordinating the rebates, the incentive programs, the overall utility 
load management system, the economies of scale, the direction from the G&T… 
That was huge, really got us going in the right direction. Otherwise, we would have 






 Going into the stabilization phase of the co-ops’ deployment, intermediary functions 
expanded to include more of the distribution utilities and external program partners. Distribution 
cooperatives undertook intermediary functions such as warehousing, business creation, and 
education that were formerly taken up alone by the G&T. With heavier involvement by locally-
connected utilities, important decision processes were formalized, built on the structures (both in 
communication networks and governance) that the G&Ts first helped establish. Electric inspectors 
and contractors could input and collaborate on distribution cooperative program rules and 
responsibilities; individual cooperatives and member-owners pursued programs and pilots in 
conjunction with the G&T’s own programs; and constitutional, collective action, and operational 
rules were modified year after year in a constant muddling-through of best practices. These 
feedback loops developed the stability of each program’s development, playing out in 
intermediaries such as committees, boards, and member services representatives that relayed 
changes throughout the course of each program between actors, institutions, and scales.  
As the load management programs carried on into the re-creation phase, manufacturers 
and third-party vendors and contractors became more proficient in provisioning market-ready load 
management products. They too took on more intermediary functions such as legitimation, 
business creation, and customer marketing and education that were formerly taken up alone by the 
G&T and distribution utilities. Today many distribution utilities seem to compete and cooperate with 
third-party aggregators such as smart thermostat vendors, reflecting the expansion of the common 
pool resource on the grid.  
These shifting intermediary actions recall the “friendly competition” that has existed 
between the distribution utilities themselves for the past four decades. In this way, it seems there 
are constant feedback loops that inform and are being informed by electric utilities’ institutional and 
social innovations on the grid. Stronger feedback loops might increase the speed of a deployment, 
just as weaker feedback loops might hinder it, and the MLP is better thought of a joint creation 




5.3. Polycentricity and its Implications for Understanding DER 
Deployment, In and Outside of Cooperatives 
Following the results of this study, and the premises accepted in the past two sections on 
the TIS and MLP, it seems clear that the co-ops’ load management deployments were polycentric, 
constructed, social, and political. Always different, always the same were these programs: 
interviewees often cited the constancy of centralized rates – along with ever-present contractor, 
member-owner, and distribution cooperative education and coordination – as being keys to the 
programs’ ongoing success. The acts of dictating and communicating the rules, then, between the 
meta-constitutional, constitutional, collective choice, and operational layers was key to upholding 
the common pool resource of the grid (Ostrom, 2008). 
But currently the common pool resource, once closed to outside interference, is undergoing 
a period of vast technological change and external influence from wholesale markets, posing some 
uncertainty for the programs in general. Though the programs can continue as before between the 
G&T and distribution utility, new third parties offer solutions to member-owners, and the G&Ts 
necessarily interface with wholesale markets such as MISO. As in the 1970s and prior, when 
individual utilities used timer clocks and radio or ripple control receivers to perform their own load 
management functions, today the ever-present piloting of the distribution utilities seems more 
individual, and less collective.  
Then as now, while distribution utilities continue to individualize, G&Ts seek to collectivize. 
Now to maintain the collective interests of the commons, it therefore seems necessary to centralize 
and coordinate greater system goals, as in the 1970s. The programs can continue to exist behind-
the-meter between the G&T and distribution utility; however, full system value will not be achieved 
until the programs are fully integrated from the wholesale markets to the member-owner. 
Yet it’s also clear from these interviews and subsequent research that to even begin 
collective resource management in the ‘70s, the co-ops faced external shocks (in the form of oil 




able to integrate long-term system needs (such as decarbonization or DER maximization) without 
broader signals from a facilitative regime, as Ostrom (1990) described. In the first place, the co-
ops also needed a level of supportive policies to allow their load management programs to begin 
and thrive; they may need such an environment to re-create again. For example, few interviewees 
were able to name important government policies that affected their deployment, yet there was an 
entire background in interviews and documentary research of cooperatively-determined and state-
determined policies that affected deployment.  
- Electric cooperative co-determined policies included mandates (no electric heat without 
dual fuel), standards and informal licensure (best practices or preferred contractor lists), 
goals (G&T-wide load factor improvement), financing (rebate pooling, loan funds), 
product guarantees (for water heaters and dual fuel systems), and education policies 
through a variety of means.  
 
- Important government policies included Department of Energy grants, Rural 
Electrification Administration or Rural Utilities Services/Department of Agriculture grants 
and loans, state policies for efficiency standards, and even integrated resource planning 
rules, which made the cooperatives negotiate with a broader set of policy stakeholders in 
their demand-side management programs. Other known impactful policies include 
emissions standards for diesel generators, technology and communication system 
standards for engineering and system interoperability, and the variety of rules dictating 
services within the wholesale energy markets.  
 
That the co-ops sought to integrate their programs with government policies – i.e. load 
management’s consideration in Minnesota’s Conservation Improvement Program and their 
education program’s offer of credits toward state licensure requirements for contractors – means 
they were concerned with how they legitimated their innovations within a broader sphere of 
influence. This speaks to a broader, co-created environment of policies, one more than most 
cooperatives are willing to admit. It also speaks to nests of polycentric governance that stretch 
beyond the co-ops themselves and greater lessons from these case studies. 
With these findings of more broadly-constructed regimes and landscapes, I believe the 
biggest lesson from the case studies may be that as electricity is taken to be a bundle of goods, so 
too may an electric utility be theorized as a bundle of intermediary roles. This is different from the 




to customers and receives revenue (Figure 5.1). Either vertically-integrated as investor-owned 
utilities, or deregulated as co-ops are, traditional electric utilities perform intermediary roles only 
vertically and to aggregate for classes of customers. Intermediary functions in this view are solely 
technical and economic. 
What this study finds, however, is that the electric utility as an actor in a technological 
innovation system with DER deployment requires intermediary functions between and within levels 
and across utility and non-utility actors (Figure 5.2). Those roles can loosely correspond to meta-
constitutional, constitutional, collective-choice, and operational rules of the grid’s voltage levels. 
Intermediary functions are vertical across layers (as when cooperatives determine incentives for 
load management based on G&T and wholesale incentives, or when co-ops distribute load 
management technologies for manufacturers), horizontal between utility actors (as when member-
owners help diffuse the adoption between themselves), and horizontal between utility and non-
utility actors (as when the cooperatives educate and coordinate contractors). How the utility 
chooses to intermediate these different roles will impact the speed, effectiveness, and longevity of 
any energy transition utilizing distributed energy resources such as load management and perhaps 
other types of DERs. The different roles will include, among other subjects, what the utility chooses 
to do in-house versus through incentivizing and coordinating third parties or consumers, how it 
accommodates for regional differences, why it pursues some distributed energy resources over 
others. All these decisions speak to an inherent polycentricity in the electric grid, resulting in an 
expanded definition of the electric utility as a polycentric institution (Figure 5.3).  
Because the electric grid is polycentric, naturally and through negotiation over time, 
intermediary functions are created to support connections between actors and institutions. These 
functions necessitate appropriately scaled rules and governance platforms for DERs. For the 
decentralized nature of DERs, it seems that only when these innovation functions between 
polycentric system actors are encouraged and strengthened may the system be successful in the 





Figure 5.1: Traditional View 
of an Electric Utility. Here the 
intermediary functions of the 
utility are symbolized by the 
arrows between the layers of 
the grid. Traditionally, the 
electric utility is thought of 
power plants and wires. Thus, 
its intermediary functions 
relate mainly to one-way 
power and revenue flows. 
 
Figure 5.2: Intermediary 
Functions of the Electric 
Utility Between Utility and 
Non-utility Components. 
From meta-constitutional to 
operational levels, as detailed 
by Ostrom (1990), the electric 
utility has been shown in this 
study to include bundles of 
intermediary functions that 
span horizontal and vertical 
scales from G&T to member-
owner and non-utility partners. 
These intermediary functions 
present the type of formal and 
informal relationships that help 
negotiate rule and program 
shifts across and between 
levels of deployment. 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Expanded View 
of the Electric Utility. The 
electric utility and its 
intermediary functions 
(symbolized as arrows) must 
include non-utility actors and 
institutions. Innovation 
therefore can be polycentric in 
a system that DER 
deployments. These 
deployments may be better off 
in the short- and long-run 






5.4. Implications for Future Research 
It is here, however, that I note my study’s limitations in making these claims and note the 
need for future research. Given my small interview sample and focus on a subset of utilities, more 
research is needed to clarify the constellations and networks of DER system actors (such as 
contractors and member-owners and board members) and their roles in forming these programs 
throughout time. My interviews also focused more on the past, and to reach a more substantial 
input on the present, more research and process tracing on current technology and dissemination 
is needed. As this study makes a new connection between polycentricity and the TIS, and between 
decarbonization and DERs, more research is necessary to understand the applicability of this 
approach, even in scenarios where top-down or market regulations dominate. Specific examples 
should also show distinct failures, as these co-op programs are bundles of mostly successes. 
There is also need in this study to connect load management with broader demand-side 
management opportunities; as other utilities have noted the difficulties in connecting the different 
types of DER with each other (Potter et al., 2018), it would be a fruitful research avenue to compare 
intermediary functions across different DER offerings within a selection of utilities. There is a 
definite need to distinguish more specifically between types of DER deployments (e.g. rooftop solar, 
distributed wind, conservation measures such as LEDs, etc.) and see how system actors and 
institutions vary across those dimensions. In addition, there may be some DERs (such as rooftop 
solar or types of energy efficiency) that are not wanted by incumbent actors in an electric grid 
common pool resource: under what conditions do those resources emerge? Is it polycentric still, or 
does it require more market-driven and top-down regulation?  
Within an electric grid more broadly, and in this study more specifically, more research is 
needed to clarify the role of political and social power imbalances within and outside of the common 
pool resource framework, as other studies have done (Klooster, 2000). This study recognizes but 




elections (as is common with many consumer cooperatives), the inherent power imbalances 
between contractors and other third parties and distribution cooperatives or G&Ts, and the 
technocratic utility ownership that naturally disfavors member-owner agency. These power 
imbalances, along with disinterested distribution utilities and member-owners, mean a DER 
deployment could be detrimental to group outcomes, and therefore challenging in CPR 
governance. Fairness would be important to examine in this light: does the construction of fairness 
result in more DER deployment? How is fairness (and notions of cross-subsidy) constructed 
between DER users? Federal and state policies, too, or at least the threat of them, seem to have 
played a larger role than was admitted by interviewees, so further research could show how 
incumbent intermediary functions relate to politics and policies. At the least, future studies could 
show how power shapes expectations and control from the top-down perspective, and how the 
electric grid as a common pool resource is helped or hindered by these power struggles. 
There is more need to clarify internal and external governance outcomes as they relate to 
DER deployment; none of the utilities in this study have the same governance structures, and it 
would be fruitful to connect structures to DER outcomes, too. The same goes for utilities: 
understanding their institutional and organizational means for change and interaction may yield 
substantial understanding for the barriers and opportunities of DER deployments in other 
subnational or regional settings. Further clarification is also needed to specify how these 
intermediary functions shift in utilities with different ownership, incentive structures, and countries 
of origin.  
The lens of polycentricity seems more appropriate now than ever, given the number of 
actors and system changes involved with climate change. Determining the bounds and notions of 
intermediary functions, and their demonstrated effects on research, development, and deployment, 
will be another key research contribution.  
Finally, future research could focus on larger, longitudinal shifts in landscapes and regimes 




the REA and associated financiers provided stable funding for DER expansion and intermediary 
functions from the co-ops, but what of other utilities or third parties? The role of stable, patient 
capital, and its shift from utility equity to third-party debt over time, needs to be studied more. In 
addition, it will be important to understand how the path dependencies of these financial and other 
technological regimes relate to new frontiers in electrification, new DER deployment, and cross-




J.A. Baker wrote, “The hardest thing of all to see is what is really there” (Baker, 1967). So 
it was with the electric cooperatives and their intermediary functions and load management 
programs, whose history lies outside the utilities’ self-written volumes and the realms of energy 
policymaking today. From research and interviews with and about these co-ops, this study finds 
that intermediary functions were necessary to achieve and sustain the co-ops’ distributed energy 
deployment. These intermediary functions – by facilitating the innovation process between two or 
more parties – served as rules and actions that allowed the necessarily diverse polycentric 
governance of the electric grid to compete and cooperate in the co-ops’ deployments. It was only 
by recognizing the nested social, economic, political, and technological levels that these 
cooperatives (and perhaps any other electric utility pursuing a DER deployment) were able to 
sustain a distributed energy adoption for so long. Finding polycentricity, intermediary innovation 
functions, and a broader network of institutional changes and challenges, I believe that my methods 
and results could serve to inform other studies, organizations, and policies. 
In the near time, I produce analogies for current energy transitions and policymaking. 
Perhaps the foremost is the revelation of polycentricity within innovation functions, giving credence 
to what Ostrom (2010) writes, “’One size fits all’ policies are not effective.” The disdain of policy 




Lenhart et al., Forthcoming). These refrains are often perceived as reluctance or opposition to 
change to carbon-free energy, new technology, or new business models. Yet now after assuming 
this project, I understand there’s another facet: the need for aligning social and institutional rules to 
match the co-ops’ innovation functions and, more generally, creating cooperative mechanisms for 
cross-sectoral and cross-technology intermediary innovation functions within the electric grid and 
society today. Private and social value must be negotiated within robust, multi-scalar institutions 
that are commensurate with the level on the grid for which they produce. 
These institutions, policies, and values can take many forms. In the following sections, I’ll 
attempt to enumerate some of them through general observations, policy and institutional 
recommendations, and further research ideas.  
At the least, it’s important now to say that intermediary functions – serving to facilitate 
cooperative and competitive actions such as financing, outreach, and a host of institutional 
arrangements between two or more parties – seem to be entirely necessary to bridge the gaps 
between sectors and technologies types for further system change for decarbonization, 
digitalization, and general interconnectedness of the grid today. Though further study is needed to 
identify types of intermediary actions necessary for these gaps, this study’s detailing of 
cooperatives’ experience with intermediary actions shows early insights into how agricultural, 
heating, and commercial and industrial sectors were approached with novel facilitative techniques 
to induce them to load management. Further elaboration could be spent on how these 
intermediation techniques can be more generalized, as in Kivimaa et al. (2019), and applied to local 
resources and governance models. 
Seeing this, I frame my conclusions under three subjects with broader implications: 1) the 
need for aggregators as translators of risk and value between micro- and macro-levels, 2) the 
understanding of system efficiency as socially constructed and self-corrected by polycentric 




polycentricity, and 3) local institutions and incumbents as able to recreate themselves and facilitate 
new social and institutional structures.  
 
6.1. Aggregators Connect the Micro- and Macro-levels 
Aggregation can be defined as “the act of grouping distinct agents in a power system (i.e. 
consumers, producers, prosumers, or any mix thereof) to act as a single entity when engaging in 
power system markets (both wholesale and retail) or selling services to the system operator(s)” 
(Burger, Chaves-Ávila, Batlle, & Pérez-Arriaga, 2017). As Burger et al. (2017) demonstrate, there 
are differences in aggregation duties as technology and regulations become more advanced 
(Figure 6.1). These differences are important and speak to an ideal economically efficient world 
and similarities to others’ definitions of intermediaries.  
 
Figure 6.1: The Value of Aggregators Based on Technology and Regulatory Contexts. 
Fundamental aggregation values are time- and customer-independent, while transitory aggregation 
values are based on present or near-future regulations and markets. Opportunistic aggregation 
values emerge as aggregators take advantage of system “flaws” and arbitrage for private gain. 





But the real value of Burger et al.’s aggregators may be in the “Transitory Aggregation” 
tenets, which speak more broadly to the intermediation functions that cooperatives and third parties 
could provide for each other in the future. They could close information gaps for each other and 
customers; deploy advanced technology where either has resource limitations; and translate and 
coordinate for other system agents. As the grid and society will be processing many micro- and 
macro-level challenges of decarbonization for years to come, my study shows that while managing 
the complexity will be a challenge, research on common pool resource management shows it is 
the muddling-through of best practices through “Transitory Aggregation” that can produce the best 
long-term results. Utilities are aggregators, as are third-parties: if they are to succeed in long-term 
DER deployment together, they need governance and institutional rules to match their polycentric 
nodes of decision-making 
6.1.1.  Potential Policy/Institutional Solutions 
Facilitating for system goals and hedging between private interests of each other and the 
greater social interests, G&Ts and distribution utilities showed that in practice, aggregation is a 
political, polycentric process. With that history, there are two futures ahead for the co-ops in this 
study: one where DERs can actively participate in the wholesale market, and one where they can’t. 
These front-of-the-meter and behind-the-meter futures, respectively, require different strategies 
and depend on if and how third-parties can participate in aggregation, as well (Thomas & Dennis, 
2019).  
The front-of-the-meter future is one where the independent system operators, guided by 
FERC, its own stakeholders, and docket commenters, will open a more-complete DER aggregation. 
Aggregation rules will be with or without third-party involvement, geographic allowances, and other 
requirements. Other ISOs operate DER aggregation markets, but markets like MISO and SPP are 
currently limited in their offerings and co-ops might be limited in their appetite to participate. 
Therefore either through the ISOs or FERC, the co-ops could push for (or accept) broader meta-




been recommended in other papers (Gundlach & Webb, 2018). Co-ops might keep in mind the 
ways in which they can work with the rules of the commons to re-align themselves toward system 
benefit and innovation, updating their communication systems to include distributed energy 
resource management systems and other two-way communication systems. As such, relationships 
with other utilities, regulators, third-parties, and customers will need to be maintained and explored 
increase visibility and connections between the transmission and distribution levels. For co-ops 
specifically in this future, aggregator subsidiaries should be explored at the G&T level, or at least 
on a joint level between member utilities, and standard working procedures with third-parties should 
be formalized within the cooperative institutions. 
But as Illinois is the only state in the MISO footprint that allows DER aggregation, and with 
NRECA advocating for opt-out provisions for co-ops at FERC, a behind-the-meter future for co-
ops’ load management programs seems just as likely (Migden-Ostrander, Shenot, Kadoch, Dupuy, 
& Linvill, 2018). This behind-the-meter future, as so operates today, creates a world where the co-
ops have more uncertainty at the wholesale level and have self-determined, but more limited 
opportunities with third parties and their member-owners. In this future, it seems member-owners 
will have more power over their own loads, regardless of what the G&T or member co-op may do 
in the short- and long-runs. The co-ops may have to consider moving outside the traditional utility 
control of devices, further incentivizing voluntary programs for load reduction, as some co-ops have 
done already. System technological innovations must be further incentivized through proper price 
signals and third-party aggregators must be worked with on an ad hoc basis for specific 
technological functions. Because the behind-the-meter future involves sporadic private benefits of 
member-owners and individual member co-ops, G&T systems and state policy might create further 
education, intermediation, and incentives and for DER adoption among member-owners. 
To ease the transformation toward simultaneous futures of community aggregation goals 
(front-of-the-meter) and individual member-owners (behind-the-meter), in the present the co-ops 




resources at the G&T or state level for continued voluntary programs outside their direct control, 
and where a common platform and long-run benefit exists for system integration, they might seek 
some centralized control of loads, either at the G&T or distribution level. Centralized control might 
facilitate fluctuations on the retail grid, as well as the wholesale, depending on the member-owners’ 
risk appetite and penetration of intermittent renewable energy technology. 
The move toward new business models takes years of trial-and-error, so effective 
governance through more committees, informational meetings, and other platforms seem 
necessary to handle changes in the short- and long-runs, regardless of wholesale market 
outcomes. In general, to better integrate third parties into these governance platforms, and as 
before with contractors, co-ops could vet and educate vendors with their member-owners and 
boards. The G&T and its member utilities might also consider seriously to include provisions for 
buying services from distribution cooperatives and their third-party partners to further incentivize 
member-owner acceptance of new DER technologies such as electric vehicles, distributed storage, 
and newer DERs such as smart thermostats.  
6.1.2.  Research Needs 
Further research is needed on aggregators to identify future business models and how well 
governance platforms currently incorporate them (S.P. Burger & M. Luke, 2017). Research could 
also specify disaggregate intermediary functions as examples of aggregation in a new market: for 
example, the intermediary functions that solar developers play in customer acquisition and 
management could be compared against utilities’ functions in load management customer 
acquisition and management. Additional research could also more clearly explain the ways in which 
aggregators translate rules and span boundaries between levels of an electric grid, and how exactly 







6.2. Polycentric Networks Self-correct in Supply and Demand 
Policies for Durable Decarbonization 
Fighting climate change is often thought of as policies that restrict demand or support the 
supply or demand for clean energy substitutes (Green & Denniss, 2018). A strong case, however, 
is for the evolution of existing institutions, structures, technologies, or practices to ease those and 
other policies to come into play (Davidson, 2019). As the importance of polycentric networks is in 
their ability to self-correct, the ability to manage and experiment in different policy mixes may be 
their biggest advantage in a climate-concerned world dealing with urgent costs and crises (Aligica 
& Tarko, 2012; Markard, 2018b). Policymakers at states and co-ops can therefore look to stronger 
institutional policies and models to develop polycentric learning, experimentation, and urgency in 
the age of decarbonization. 
6.2.1.  Potential Policy/Institutional Solutions 
Just as markets allow price discovery, and mandates force the alignment of system goals, 
polycentric organizations can be used for institutional discovery, to see the best practices for 
aligning system and private goals within a regime. It seems important, therefore, that locally-
connected institutions be created, empowered, and/or connected to electric grid decarbonization 
plans to test policy sequencing and feedback loops, showing new approaches to cross-sector and 
cross-technology decarbonization practices. In practice, this might look like the aggregators in the 
previous section, or simpler ad hoc aggregators such as DER cooperatives or community groups. 
Even current distribution cooperatives can perform this locally-relevant experimentation.  
To build toward that polycentric future, policymakers at the co-ops or states could also 
spend resources on making current governance platforms at co-ops and other utilities more 
inclusive and understandable to other sectors, third-parties, and customers. Policymakers could 
also aim at empowering different types of intermediaries between sectors and technologies, such 
as contractors or distribution cooperatives, with more education and resources on current and 
future technologies. As there were generational disputes and laggards in the past with the load 




member-cooperative personnel and member-owners along with current trends, however long it 
might take. The focus should be on long-term engagement. And alongside long-term engagement, 
more resources will be needed to expand implementation of common infrastructures, such as 
electric vehicle charging networks or distributed energy resource management systems, for these 
polycentric schemes to co-evolve with their institutions. 
In their way, cooperatives are already practicing institutional evolution and self-correction 
alongside innovation, but existing policy frameworks could better support as exist as facilitative 
regimes them as decarbonization becomes the main goal of society. As fossil-fueled power plants 
may have to be retired ahead of schedule, and rates may see increases, policymakers could 
identify ways in which the co-ops could deploy DERs while simultaneously paying down debts and 
other fixed costs. GRE, for instance, was mentioned by an interviewee to use accelerated 
depreciation on their coal plants, effectively closing them in the 2020s. Meanwhile Basin extended 
the useful life of their coal plants decades into the future. This exemplifies that, given the breadth 
of the climate problem, local institutional self-determination may not be enough for short-term 
change, in the co-ops or in other utilities or countries, but there remains an array of financial and 
social solutions to the perceived stickiness of current and future problems.  
To remedy, policymakers at the federal or state levels could simulate the past external 
shocks of the oil or farm crisis with carbon pricing or clean energy standards to align cooperative 
and utility networks with a broader social and economic goals. Cooperative boards could simulate 
external shocks by taking precautionary measures unto themselves, self-taxing or creating DER 
options (such as community solar) for member co-ops and member-owners to elect agency for 
decarbonization. These DER options would mirror the use of load management as a pressure valve 
for co-ops in the economic crises of the ‘70s and ‘80s. They would also require the same effort and 
intermediary functions as was deployed then. For the purposes of political durability within the co-
ops, top-down actions such as clean energy standards or carbon pricing must be coupled with 




national networks might work together to create innovation networks and allocative strategies for 
DERs in the coming decades of decarbonization. 
As co-ops focus more on provisioning DER services, whether due to member-owner needs 
or broader landscape pressures, a direct policy and economic link must made between DERs and 
climate change for the broader goal of decarbonization to work. For some co-ops, that link is not 
appetizing or demanded by current member-owners. But looking into these co-ops histories and 
central system concepts, one could see that just as load building once propped up existing coal 
plants, load building could also decrease their usage and pay them and other fossil-fueled assets 
off early. Policymakers and cooperative personnel might therefore consider policies to help them 
strategically build load once again (seeking “area coverage,” as in the beginning of the REA), 
whether it is through electric vehicles, decarbonized appliances, or larger commercial and industrial 
electrification, and connect that extra load growth to stranded fossil-fueled asset repayments. 
Facilitative regimes at the federal level could use RUS debt, or even cooperative financing 
institutions, to help fund such a transition. 
6.2.2.  Research Needs 
Because there are no large-scale examples of quick, large-scale energy transitions 
available, examples of smaller-scale cooperation and competition through polycentricity could 
perhaps be the intermediary building blocks for a larger transition (Schot & Kanger, 2018). Future 
research could focus on how smaller clusters of polycentric organizations help build (or don’t) 
toward larger cumulative emissions reductions. There is also a greater need to identify if polycentric 
organizations can supply large-scale changes in short amounts of time. It remains a large question 
as to how much time we have left, if any, at this point to see these long-lasting institutions develop. 
In all, the co-ops must seriously research and pilot how their intermediary functions can be 
communalized and strengthened toward system aggregator goals in this greater age of 





6.3. Active Incumbents Are Able to Change and Lead Consumers 
Utilities today, on the whole, still struggle with customer engagement and segmentation 
(Trabish, 2019). In deploying their distributed energy resource-based programs, they have 
sometimes failed to realize the importance of education, coordination, and marketing (Thill, 2019). 
Yet their collective histories have shown they’ve always been leading customers to join the electric 
grid and increase their demand. From Insull’s “load management” to the electric cooperatives’ “area 
coverage” and this study’s focus on load management, utilities have always cultivated electricity 
demand and technological adoption. To say that utilities are just responding to customers is a 
truism at this point, and perhaps for the fragmented responsibilities of their customer-sided 
business practices, they lack the appropriately-scaled intermediaries to comprehensively interact 
with them. This is important as the DER solution space expands, and the need for cross-sector 
greenhouse gas emission reductions increase. 
6.3.1.  Potential Policy/Institutional Solutions 
Given the results from this study, electric utilities might be thought of now as central 
coordinating agents for cross-sector and -technology work. The cooperatives’ load management 
programs, most notably, showed this in their work with agriculture, fossil-fueled heating, and 
commercial and industrial regimes. With agriculture, they incorporated locally-relevant knowledge 
and practices to accommodate distinct individual farms and their irrigation units. With heating, they 
were directly competitive, with interviewees often pricing their products to the marginal price of a 
coal plant or the dominant heating fuel in the area. Commercial and industrial facilities were made 
interruptible or facilitated with utility-controlled generators and negotiated with on a case-by-case 
basis. Today, as these co-ops are again engaged with electric vehicle regimes, bringing their 
electric “power” to bear to reduce transportation emissions in the United States, it seems natural 





Then as now, limitations on internal staff capacity and expertise should be bridged by G&T 
resources or state policymakers. Resources should be leveraged to help bring on more permanent 
and/or knowledgeable member services and board directors, more specifically, to help bridge these 
gaps between utility and non-utility spheres. Policymakers should also encourage broad suites of 
policy mixes to further allow utilities to be social actors for the greater good. They could provide 
base incentives or different types of DERs (i.e. solar-and-storage facilities to replace generators at 
C&I facilities) or loosen restrictions on demand-side management programs such that they can 
include the testing and involvement of new technologies and practices. This last point is important 
for other utilities, as current practices and regulations often segment DER planning and personnel 
from each other (Potter et al., 2018).  
Under top-down mandates, policymakers could also encourage cross-sector experimental 
projects such as Washington’s proposed “Energy Transformation Projects” (ETPs) that might better 
facilitate the social, political, and institutional polycentricity of the co-ops (Roberts, 2019). Utilities 
and other could use ETPs to reduce system emissions, rather than individual emissions (similar to 
the CIP’s difference individual efficiency versus systems efficiency). ETPs could also be used for 
compliance with a larger clean energy standard and promote utilities engaging in more intermediary 
practices for their customers to conserve or strategically grow their usage. In this way, facilitative 
regimes could once again foster polycentric governance to build cross-sectoral competence at a 
time when cross-sector work is desperately needed. 
6.3.2.  Research Needs 
Future research now should continue to look at past efforts in utility and third-party 
engagement strategies with customers and what types of policies best encourage of facilitate these 
measures. Other studies might look at incumbents and how they change through time across 
various regimes, picking up the slack for each other as technologies and energy sources come and 
go. More research is also needed on the past successes and failures of cross-sector work and what 




6.4. Final Statement 
The cooperatives’ load management programs are insights into local and regional history, 
showing diverse technological practices for diverse needs and people. Presented with great 
uncertainty, these organizations co-created rational sets of problems and solutions that involved all 
levels and geographies of their state-sized service areas. They changed themselves and their 
member-owners’ habits to endure through trying times.  
Now their authority in having created a distributed energy transition endows them and 
others with the authority to recognize that larger, more systematic changes can be built on the back 
of smaller changes. These smaller changes are social as well as technological: the co-ops included 
marginalized perspectives in their facilitation of easing rate increases for certain ratepayers; they 
sought social learning and capacity building through novel shared governance platforms; and they 
performed innovation intermediary functions to ease collaboration between many parties on the 
polycentric electric grid.  
Because of this study, utilities are better known as social, political, and constructive 
institutions of innovation, and innovation within DER deployments can be thought of as a result of 
broader polycentric system negotiations. Further research is needed, but I hope now that utilities 
and others will better recognize their systems for the diverse values they encourage. Co-ops are 
worthy, and always have been, of weathering greater challenges, facilitating more participation, 
encouraging more decision-making and negotiation, with the greater aim of encouraging large-











Aligica, P. D., & Tarko, V. (2012). Polycentricity: From Polanyi to Ostrom, and Beyond. 
Governance, 25(2), 237–262. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.2011.01550.x 
Andersson, K. P., & Ostrom, E. (2008). Analyzing decentralized resource regimes from a 
polycentric perspective. Policy Sciences, 41(1), 71–93. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11077-
007-9055-6 
Araújo, K. (2014). The emerging field of energy transitions: Progress, challenges, and 
opportunities. Energy Research & Social Science, 1, 112–121. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2014.03.002 
Araújo, K. (2017). Low Carbon Energy Transitions: Turning Points in National Policy. New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press. 
Argonne National Laboratory, Systems Control, Inc., Gordian Associates, Inc., & Temple, Barker 
and Sloane, Ince. (1980). Benefits and Costs of Load Management: A Technical-
Assistance and Resource-Material Handbook (No. ANL/SPG-12). Retrieved from U.S. 
Department of Energy website: https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/5108224 
Baker, J. A. (1967). The Peregrine. London: HarperCollins Publishers. 
Bergek, A., Jacobsson, S., Carlsson, B., Lindmark, S., & Rickne, A. (2008). Analyzing the functional 
dynamics of technological innovation systems: A scheme of analysis. Research Policy, 
37(3), 407–429. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2007.12.003 




Bonneville Power Administration. (1977). The Role of the Bonneville Power Administration in the 
Pacific Northwest Power Supply System, Including Its Participation in the Hydro-thermal 
Power Program: Appendix A, BPA Power Resources, Acquisitions, Planning and 
Operations. Department of the Interior. 
Breetz, H., Mildenberger, M., & Stokes, L. (2018). The political logics of clean energy transitions. 
Business and Politics, 20(04), 492–522. https://doi.org/10.1017/bap.2018.14 
Burger, S., Chaves-Ávila, J. P., Batlle, C., & Pérez-Arriaga, I. J. (2017). A review of the value of 
aggregators in electricity systems. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 77, 395–
405. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2017.04.014 
Capehart, B. L. (n.d.). RESIDENTIAL LOAD MANAGEMENT - A SURVEY OF COSTS AND 
BENEFITS. 28. 
Cebul, B. (2018). Creative Competition: Georgia Power, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the 
Creation of a Rural Consumer Economy, 1934–1955. Journal of American History, 105(1), 
45–70. https://doi.org/10.1093/jahist/jay007 
Chaddad, F. R., & Cook, M. L. (2004). Understanding New Cooperative Models: An Ownership-
Control Rights Typology. Review of Agricultural Economics, 26(3), 348–360. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9353.2004.00184.x 
Chan, G., Lenhart, S., Forsberg, L., Grimley, M., & Wilson, E. (2019). Barriers and Opportunities 
for Distributed Energy Resources in Minnesota’s Municipal Utilities and Electric 
Cooperatives. Retrieved from https://chan-lab.umn.edu/municoop 
Chew, B., Feldman, B., Ghosh, D., & Surampudy, M. (2018). 2018 Utility Demand Response 
Market Snapshot. Retrieved February 9, 2019, from SEPA website: 
https://sepapower.org/resource/2018-demand-response-market-snapshot/ 
Cole, D. H. (2015). Advantages of a polycentric approach to climate change policy. Nature Climate 
Change, 5(2), 114–118. https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2490 




Connett, G. (2001, February 22). Report on 2000 and 2001 Energy Conservation and Load 




Cooper, J. (2008). Electric Co-Operatives: From New Deal to Bad Deal Policy Essay. Harvard 
Journal on Legislation, 45, 335–376. 
Cooper, M. (2016). Renewable and distributed resources in a post-Paris low carbon future: The 
key role and political economy of sustainable electricity. Energy Research & Social 
Science, 19, 66–93. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2016.05.008 
Corey, G. R. (1979, July 15). Keynote Address: The Role of The Electric Utility In The U.S. Energy 
Future. Presented at the Peak-Load Pricing and Thermal Energy Storage. Retrieved from 
https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/6550311 
Cox, M., Arnold, G., & Villamayor Tomás, S. (2010). A Review of Design Principles for Community-
based Natural Resource Management. Ecology and Society, 15(4). 
https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-03704-150438 
Cudahy, H. R. D., & Henderson, W. D. (2005). From Insull to Enron: Corporate (Re)Regulation 
after the Rise and Fall of Two Energy Icons (SSRN Scholarly Paper No. ID 716321). 
Retrieved from Social Science Research Network website: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=716321 
Dairyland Power Cooperative. (1985). Dairyland Power Cooperative System Power Requirements 




Dakota Electric Association. (1987, December 11). LETTER--OFFERING A CREDIT DIRECTLY 
TO THE OFF-PEAK MEMBERS. 
Dakota Electric Association. (2014, July 2). In the Matter of the Application of DAKOTA ELECTRIC 
ASSOCIATION for Authority to Increase Rates for Electric Service in Minnesota, Docket 
No. E-111/GR-14-482: PREFILED DIRECT TESTIMONY OF DOUGLAS R. LARSON VP 
OF REGULATORY SERVICES DAKOTA ELECTRIC ASSOCIATION. 
Davidson, D. J. (2019). Exnovating for a renewable energy transition. Nature Energy, 4(4), 254. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41560-019-0369-3 
Donovan, Hamester, & Rattien, Inc. (1979). Investigating load management technology options: a 
survey of technologies and issues. Final report. [Competitive interrelationships of LM, 
conservation, and renewables] (No. DOE/ER/10085-T1). https://doi.org/10.2172/5564935 
Doyle, J. (1979). Lines Across the Land: Rural Electric Cooperatives, The Changing Politics of 
Energy in Rural America. Washington, DC: Energy Policy Institute. 
East River Electric Power Cooperative. (2018). East River Electric Power Cooperative 2018 Annual 
Report. Retrieved April 9, 2019, from East River Electric website: 
https://www.eastriver.coop/about/ 
EcoMotion. (1993). United Power Association, Off-Peak Program: Profile #56 (p. 16). Retrieved 
from http://ecomotion.us/pdfs/56.pdf 
EIA. (2018). Form EIA-861. Retrieved from https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia861/ 
Electro Industries. (2014). Electro Industries - About Us. Retrieved March 31, 2019, from 
http://electromn.com/aboutus/index.htm 
Eleff, B. (2017). Residential Space Heating Fuels in Minnesota (p. 16). Retrieved from Research 
Department of the Minnesota House of Representatives website: 
https://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/heatfuel.pdf 




Energy Utilization Systems, Inc. (1982). 1980 suvey and evaluation of utility conservation, load 
management, and solar end-use projects, volume 3: utility load management projects. U.S. 
Department of Energy. 
Engelking, B. (1995, July 20). Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, Staff Briefing Papers: ET-




Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. (2008). FERC: Industries - Demand Response & 
Advanced Metering 2008 Surveys. Retrieved April 5, 2019, from 
https://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/demand-response/2008/survey.asp 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. (1997). Assessing the Midwest Economy - Federal Reserve 
Bank of Chicago. Retrieved April 23, 2019, from 
https://www.chicagofed.org/region/midwest-economy/assessing-the-midwest-economy 
Fischer, L.-B., & Newig, J. (2016). Importance of Actors and Agency in Sustainability Transitions: 
A Systematic Exploration of the Literature. Sustainability, 8(5), 476. 
https://doi.org/10.3390/su8050476 
Gahran, A. (2018). 2018 State of the Electric Utility Survey. Retrieved from Utility Dive website: 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/dive_assets/rlpsys/SEU_2018_Survey_final_web.pdf 
Geels, F. W. (2014). Regime Resistance against Low-Carbon Transitions: Introducing Politics and 
Power into the Multi-Level Perspective. Theory, Culture & Society, 31(5), 21–40. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276414531627 
Geels, F. W., & Schot, J. (2007). Typology of sociotechnical transition pathways. Research Policy, 
36(3), 399–417. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2007.01.003 
Geels, F. W., Schwanen, T., Sorrell, S., Jenkins, K., & Sovacool, B. K. (2018). Reducing energy 
demand through low carbon innovation: A sociotechnical transitions perspective and 
thirteen research debates. Energy Research & Social Science, 40, 23–35. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2017.11.003 
Geels, F. W., Sovacool, B. K., Schwanen, T., & Sorrell, S. (2017). Sociotechnical transitions for 
deep decarbonization. Science, 357(6357), 1242–1244. 
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aao3760 
Gellings, C. W. (1981). Power/energy: Demand-side load management: The rising cost of peak-
demand power means that utilities must encourage customers to manage power usage. 
IEEE Spectrum, 18(12), 49–52. https://doi.org/10.1109/MSPEC.1981.6369703 
Gellings, Clark W. (2017). Evolving practice of demand-side management. Journal of Modern 
Power Systems and Clean Energy, 5(1), 1–9. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40565-016-0252-1 
Gillingham, K., Newell, R., & Palmer, K. (2004). Retrospective Examination of Demand-Side 
Energy Efficiency Policies. 
Gliedt, T., Hoicka, C. E., & Jackson, N. (2018). Innovation intermediaries accelerating 
environmental sustainability transitions. Journal of Cleaner Production, 174, 1247–1261. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2017.11.054 
Goldthau, A. (2014). Rethinking the governance of energy infrastructure: Scale, decentralization 
and polycentrism. Energy Research & Social Science, 1, 134–140. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2014.02.009 
Graff, M., Carley, S., & Konisky, D. M. (2018). Stakeholder perceptions of the United States energy 
transition: Local-level dynamics and community responses to national politics and policy. 
Energy Research & Social Science, 43, 144–157. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2018.05.017 
Great River Energy. (2017, April 28). APPENDIX G GRID MODERNIZATION CATALOG: 2018-







Green, F., & Denniss, R. (2018). Cutting with both arms of the scissors: the economic and political 
case for restrictive supply-side climate policies. Climatic Change, 150(1), 73–87. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-018-2162-x 
Guenther, K. M. (2009). The politics of names: rethinking the methodological and ethical 
significance of naming people, organizations, and places. Qualitative Research, 9(4), 411–
421. https://doi.org/10.1177/1468794109337872 
Gundlach, J., & Webb, R. (2018). Distributed Energy Resource Participation in Wholesale Markets: 
Lessons from the California ISO (SSRN Scholarly Paper No. ID 3180162). Retrieved from 
Social Science Research Network website: https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3180162 
Gustafson, M. (1981). “Diversified Utilization” Can Play a Strong Hand in Dealing with the Energy 
Crisis. IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, PAS-100(11), 4661–4664. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/TPAS.1981.316808 
Harvey, H., Orvis, R., & Rissman, J. (2018). Designing Climate Solutions: A Policy Guide for Low-
Carbon Energy. Island Press. 
Hausfather, Z. (2018, December 5). Analysis: Fossil-fuel emissions in 2018 increasing at fastest 
rate for seven years. Retrieved January 8, 2019, from Carbon Brief website: 
https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-fossil-fuel-emissions-in-2018-increasing-at-fastest-
rate-for-seven-years 
Hexom, J. G. (2000). The first 50 years... East River Electric Power Cooperative. Madison, SD: 
Leader Printing Company. 
Hirsh, R. (2018). Shedding New Light on Rural Electrification: The Neglected Story of Successful 
Efforts to Power Up Farms in the 1920s and 1930s. Agricultural History, 92(3), 296–327. 
Hirsh, R. F., & Jones, C. F. (2014). History’s contributions to energy research and policy. Energy 
Research & Social Science, 1, 106–111. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2014.02.010 
Hirsh, Richard. F. (1999). Power Loss: The Origins of Deregulation and Restructuring in the 
American Electric Utility System. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Hodson, Michael, Marvin, S., & Bulkeley, H. (2013). The Intermediary Organisation of Low Carbon 
Cities: A Comparative Analysis of Transitions in Greater London and Greater Manchester. 
Urban Studies, 50(7), 1403–1422. https://doi.org/10.1177/0042098013480967 
Hodson, Mike, & Marvin, S. (2010). Can cities shape socio-technical transitions and how would we 
know if they were? Research Policy, 39(4), 477–485. 
Holt, T. (2007, October). East River’s Load Management Program: History, Operation and Future. 
Presented at the CUExchange. Retrieved from 
https://www.utilityexchange.org/assets/docs/holt_cue102407.pdf 
Howells, J. (2006). Intermediation and the role of intermediaries in innovation. Research Policy, 
35(5), 715–728. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2006.03.005 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (2018). IPCC, 2018: Summary for Policymakers. In: 
Global warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 
1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, 
in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, 
sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty [V. Masson-Delmotte, P. Zhai, 
H. O. Pörtner, D. Roberts, J. Skea, P. R. Shukla, A. Pirani, W. Moufouma-Okia, C. Péan, 
R. Pidcock, S. Connors, J. B. R. Matthews, Y. Chen, X. Zhou, M. I. Gomis, E. Lonnoy, T. 
Maycock, M. Tignor, T. Waterfield (eds.)]. Retrieved from World Meteorological 
Organization website: http://www.ipcc.ch/report/sr15/ 
International Energy Agency. (2017). Perspectives for the Energy Transition: Investment Needs for 




Kivimaa, P., Boon, W., Hyysalo, S., & Klerkx, L. (2019). Towards a typology of intermediaries in 
sustainability transitions: A systematic review and a research agenda. Research Policy, 
48(4), 1062–1075. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2018.10.006 
Kivimaa, P., & Virkamäki, V. (2014). Policy Mixes, Policy Interplay and Low Carbon Transitions: 
The Case of Passenger Transport in Finland. Environmental Policy and Governance, 
24(1), 28–41. https://doi.org/10.1002/eet.1629 
Kleckner, T., Kuser, M., Cook, A., Brooks, M., & Heidorn Jr., R. (2018, June 29). Commenters 
Divided on Distributed Energy Resource, State, LDC Roles. Retrieved April 24, 2019, from 
RTO Insider website: https://www.rtoinsider.com/ferc-distriuted-energy-resource-ldc-
energy-storage-95454/ 
Klooster, D. (2000). Institutional Choice, Community, and Struggle: A Case Study of Forest Co-
Management in Mexico. World Development, 28(1), 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0305-
750X(99)00108-4 
Köhler, J., Geels, F. W., Kern, F., Markard, J., Onsongo, E., Wieczorek, A., … Wells, P. (2019). An 
agenda for sustainability transitions research: State of the art and future directions. 
Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2019.01.004 
Kuzemko, C., Lockwood, M., Mitchell, C., & Hoggett, R. (2016). Governing for sustainable energy 
system change: Politics, contexts and contingency. Energy Research & Social Science, 
12, 96–105. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2015.12.022 
Kuzemko, C., Mitchell, C., Lockwood, M., & Hoggett, R. (2017). Policies, politics and demand side 
innovations: The untold story of Germany’s energy transition. Energy Research & Social 
Science, 28, 58–67. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2017.03.013 
Lenhart, S., Chan, G., Forsberg, L., Grimley, M., & Wilson, E. (Forthcoming). Innovation in 
Community Electric Power: Resisting and Enabling Distributed Energy Resources. 
Levy, J. S. (2008). Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference. Conflict Management 
and Peace Science, 25(1), 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1080/07388940701860318 
Loorbach, D., Frantzeskaki, N., & Avelino, F. (2017). Sustainability Transitions Research: 
Transforming Science and Practice for Societal Change. Annual Review of Environment 
and Resources, 42(1), 599–626. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-environ-102014-021340 
Lukkarinen, J., Berg, A., Salo, M., Tainio, P., Alhola, K., & Antikainen, R. (2018). An intermediary 
approach to technological innovation systems (TIS)—The case of the cleantech sector in 
Finland. Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions, 26, 136–146. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2017.04.003 
Mahoney Jr., L. T. (1979, July 15). Ratemaking and Alternative Technologies. Presented at the 
Peak-Load Pricing and Thermal Energy Storage. Retrieved from 
https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/6550311 
Markard, J. (2018a). The life cycle of technological innovation systems. Technological Forecasting 
and Social Change. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2018.07.045 
Markard, J. (2018b). The next phase of the energy transition and its implications for research and 
policy. Nature Energy, 3(8), 628. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41560-018-0171-7 
Markard, J., & Truffer, B. (2008). Technological innovation systems and the multi-level perspective: 
Towards an integrated framework. Research Policy, 37(4), 596–615. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2008.01.004 
Markard, J., Wirth, S., & Truffer, B. (2016). Institutional dynamics and technology legitimacy – A 
framework and a case study on biogas technology. Research Policy, 45(1), 330–344. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2015.10.009 
Mattes, J., Huber, A., & Koehrsen, J. (2015). Energy transitions in small-scale regions – What we 





McKay, D. J. (1979, July 15). Introduction of Peak-Load Pricing in Europe. Presented at the Peak-
Load Pricing and Thermal Energy Storage. Retrieved from 
https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/6550311 
Melville, E., Christie, I., Burningham, K., Way, C., & Hampshire, P. (2017). The electric commons: 
A qualitative study of community accountability. Energy Policy, 106, 12–21. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.03.035 
Migden-Ostrander, J., Shenot, J., Kadoch, C., Dupuy, M., & Linvill, C. (2018). Enabling Third-Party 
Aggregation of Distributed Energy Resources. Retrieved from Regulatory Assistance 
Project website: https://www.raponline.org/knowledge-center/enabling-third-party-
aggregation-distributed-energy-resources/ 
Minnesota Center for Energy and Environment, Optimal Energy, & Seventhwave. (2018). 
Minnesota Energy Efficiency Potential Study: 2020–2029 Appendix E: Load Management 




Minnesota Department of Public Service. (1992, December). 1992 Energy Policy and Conservation 
Report: Transition Into The 21st Century. Retrieved from 
https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/pre2003/mandated/930222.pdf 
Minnesota Historical Society. (1978). Minnesota Powerline Oral History Project: Interview with 
Philip O. Martin, Collections Online. Retrieved April 7, 2019, from 
http://collections.mnhs.org/cms/display?irn=10448586 
Minnesota Municipal Utilities Association. (2002, June 10). Municipal Electric Utility Conservation 
and Load Management A Report to the Minnesota Legislature. Retrieved from 
https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2009/mandated/091026.pdf 
Minnesota Pollution Control Agency. (2019). Greenhouse gas emissions in Minnesota: 1990-2016. 
Retrieved from Minnesota Department of Commerce website: 
https://www.pca.state.mn.us/sites/default/files/lraq-2sy19.pdf 
Minnesota Power, & Great River Energy. (2005, November). BIENNIAL TRANSMISSION 
PROJECTS REPORT: Certification of a High-Voltage Transmission Line, Docket No. ET2, 




Minnkota Power Cooperative. (2017, December). December 2017 Minnkota Messenger: 
Preserving a legacy system. Retrieved from 
https://issuu.com/benflad/docs/novdec_2017_messenger 
Minnkota Power Cooperative, Inc. (1995). Minnkota Power Cooperative, Inc.: 1995 Integrated 




Mitchell, B. M., Manning, Jr., W. G., & Acton, J. P. (1978). Peak-Load Pricing: European Lessons 
for U.S. Energy Policy, A Rand Corporation Research Study. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger 
Publishing Company. 
Morgan, M. G., & Talukdar, S. N. (1979). Electric power load management: Some technical, 
economic, regulatory and social issues. Proceedings of the IEEE, 67(2), 241–312. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/PROC.1979.11234 
Musiolik, J., & Markard, J. (2011). Creating and shaping innovation systems: Formal networks in 





Musiolik, J., Markard, J., Hekkert, M., & Furrer, B. (2018). Creating innovation systems: How 
resource constellations affect the strategies of system builders. Technological Forecasting 
and Social Change. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2018.02.002 
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association. (2016, February 26). History: The story behind 
America’s electric cooperatives and NRECA. Retrieved February 18, 2019, from America’s 
Electric Cooperatives website: https://www.electric.coop/our-organization/history/ 
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association. (2017, January 31). America’s Electric 
Cooperatives: 2017 Fact Sheet. Retrieved January 17, 2019, from America’s Electric 
Cooperatives website: https://www.electric.coop/electric-cooperative-fact-sheet/ 
National Rural Utilities Cooperative Finance Corporation. (2008). Setting Rates: Best Practices for 
Electric Cooperatives, Part 3. Retrieved from 
https://www.cooperative.com/cfc/documents/rates_setting_part3.pdf 
Nelson, M. D. (1981a). Minnkota’s Load Management Program: Economic Aspects. IEEE 
Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, PAS-100(3), 1389–1398. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/TPAS.1981.316613 
Nelson, M. D. (1981b). Minnkota’s Program of Load Management: Seven Years in Review. IEEE 
Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, PAS-100(4), 1553–1561. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/TPAS.1981.316542 
New Deal Network. (2013). TVA: Electricity for All. Retrieved February 18, 2019, from 
https://web.archive.org/web/20170827031624/http://newdeal.feri.org/tva/tva10.htm 
North American Electric Reliability Corporation. (2011). Demand Response Availability Data 
System (DADS): Phase I and II Final Report. Princeton, NJ. 
Northern Municipal Power Agency. (1981). Northern Municipal Power Agency Electrici System 




Northern Municipal Power Agency. (2002). Northern Municipal Power Agency Conservation 




Nowak, M. A. (2006). Five rules for the evolution of cooperation. Science (New York, N.y.), 
314(5805), 1560–1563. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1133755 
Office of the Revisor of Statutes. (2019, April 8). HF 1956 as introduced - 91st Legislature (2019 - 
2020). Retrieved April 26, 2019, from Minnesota Legislature website: 
https://www.revisor.mn.gov/bills/text.php?number=HF1956&type=bill&version=0&session
=ls91&session_year=2019&session_number=0 
Orest, Y., & Grahl, N. (2018, November 2). Arrowhead Cooperative Uses Data Analytics to Pinpoint 
Meter Issues. Retrieved April 29, 2019, from Transmission & Distribution World website: 
https://www.tdworld.com/smart-grid/arrowhead-cooperative-uses-data-analytics-pinpoint-
meter-issues 
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action. 
Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Ostrom, E. (2008). Doing Institutional Analysis: Digging Deeper than Markets and Hierarchies. In 
C. Ménard & M. M. Shirley (Eds.), Handbook of New Institutional Economics (pp. 819–
848). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-69305-5_31 
Ostrom, E. (2010). Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic 





Pérez-Arriaga, I., & Knittel, C. (2016). Utility of the future: An mit energy iniative response to an 
industry in transition. Retrieved from MIT Energy Initiative. website: 
http://energy.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Utility-of-the-Future-Full-Report.pdf 
Pikk, P., & Viiding, M. (2013). The dangers of marginal cost based electricity pricing. Baltic Journal 
of Economics, 13(1), 49–62. https://doi.org/10.1080/1406099X.2013.10840525 
Pless, J., & Fell, H. (2017). Bribes, bureaucracies, and blackouts: Towards understanding how 
corruption at the firm level impacts electricity reliability. Resource and Energy Economics, 
47, 36–55. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.reseneeco.2016.11.001 
PLMA Thought Leadership Group. (2019). Thought Leadership 2018. Retrieved from Peak Load 
Management Association website: https://www.peakload.org/assets/docs/PLMA-Thought-
Leadership-2018.pdf 
Plumer, B. (2019, January 8). U.S. Carbon Dioxide Emissions Rose in 2018. The New York Times. 
Retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/admin/100000006294698.embedded.html? 
Potter, J., Stuart, E., & Cappers, P. (2018). Barriers and Opportunities to Broader Adoption of 
Integrated Demand Side Management at Electric Utilities: A Scoping Study (No. 1425437). 
https://doi.org/10.2172/1425437 
Power Systems Engineering, Inc. (2017). Consumer-Centric Energy and Demand Programs: The 
New Business Case Guidebook. Retrieved from National Rural Electric Cooperative 
Association website: https://www.cooperative.com/programs-
services/bts/documents/reports/new_dsm_business_case_guide_final.pdf 
Puget Sound Energy. (2016). Washington Utilities and Transporation Commission v. Puget Sound 
Energy: Initial Brief of Puget Sound Energy -- Docket No. UE-151871, Docket No. UG-
151872. Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission. 
Rabl, V. A. (1988). Load Management Technologies and Programs in the U.S. In A. T. De Almeida 
& A. H. Rosenfeld (Eds.), Demand-Side Management and Electricity End-Use Efficiency 
(pp. 113–125). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1403-2_6 
Reagan, P. (1979). Regulating Electrical Utilities in Minnesota: The Reform of Legal Institutions. 
Retrieved from Minnesota Joint Legislative Committee on Science and Technology 
website: https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/pre2003/other/801327.pdf 
Reynolds, B. J. (2014, April). The New Deal Co-ops. Rural Cooperatives, 81(2), 44. 
Roberts, D. (2019, April 18). A closer look at Washington’s superb new 100% clean electricity bill. 
Retrieved April 28, 2019, from Vox website: https://www.vox.com/energy-and-
environment/2019/4/18/18363292/washington-clean-energy-bill 
Rocky Mountain Institute. (2006, April 30). Demand Response: An Introduction, Overview of 
programs, technologies, and lessons learned. Retrieved February 9, 2019, from 
https://www.swenergy.org/data/sites/1/media/documents/publications/documents/Deman
d_Response_White_Paper.pdf 
Schot, J., & Kanger, L. (2018). Deep transitions: Emergence, acceleration, stabilization and 
directionality. Research Policy, 47(6), 1045–1059. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2018.03.009 
Severson, H. (1962). The Night They Turned On The Lights: The Story of the Electric Power 
Revolution in the North Star State. Midwest Historical Features. 
Sexton, R. J. (1986). Cooperatives and the Forces Shaping Agricultural Marketing. American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 68(5), 1167–1172. https://doi.org/10.2307/1241869 
Shah, K. R., Sanger, J. O., & Mashaw, J. M. (1984). Load Management Experience of Rural Electric 
Cooperatives. IEEE Transactions on Industry Applications, IA-20(2), 443–448. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/TIA.1984.4504433 
Skjølsvold, T. M., Throndsen, W., Ryghaug, M., Fjellså, I. F., & Koksvik, G. H. (2018). Orchestrating 




and conceptual insights. Energy Research & Social Science, 46, 252–261. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2018.07.035 
Sovacool, B. K. (2016). How long will it take? Conceptualizing the temporal dynamics of energy 
transitions. Energy Research & Social Science, 13, 202–215. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2015.12.020 
S.P. Burger, & M. Luke. (2017). Business models for distributed energy resources: A review and 
empirical analysis. Energy Policy, 109, 230–248. 
Special Committee On Aging, United States Senate. (1979). Energy Assistance Programs and 
Pricing Policies In The 50 States To Benefit Elederly, Disabled, Or Low-Income 
Households: A Working Paper Prepared For Use By The Special Committee On Aging, 
United States Senate. Retrieved from U.S. Government Printing Office website: 
https://www.aging.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/reports/rpt279.pdf 
Spinak, A. (Abby E. (2014). Infrastructure and agency : rural electric cooperatives and the fight for 
economic democracy in the United States (Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology). 
Retrieved from http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/87519 
Stokes, L. C., & Breetz, H. L. (2018). Politics in the U.S. energy transition: Case studies of solar, 
wind, biofuels and electric vehicles policy. Energy Policy, 113, 76–86. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.10.057 
Thill, D. (2019, April 16). For utilities, smart thermostat programs more than a ‘set it and forget it’ 
effort. Retrieved April 18, 2019, from Energy News Network website: 
https://energynews.us/2019/04/16/midwest/for-utilities-smart-thermostat-programs-more-
than-a-set-it-and-forget-it-effort/ 
Thomas, T., & Dennis, J. (2019, May 14). Allowing DERs to participate in wholesale markets does 
not trample state and local authority. Retrieved May 16, 2019, from Utility Dive website: 
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/allowing-ders-to-participate-in-wholesale-markets-does-
not-trample-state-an/554652/ 
Trabish, H. (2019, January 8). Utilities look to Netflix audience clustering model for customer 
engagement. Retrieved January 8, 2019, from Utility Dive website: 
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/utilities-look-to-netflix-audience-clustering-model-for-
customer-engagement/545358/ 
Uhlenhuth, K. (2019, April 11). Midwest co-ops test value of placing batteries in customers’ homes. 
Retrieved April 24, 2019, from Energy News Network website: 
https://energynews.us/2019/04/11/midwest/midwest-co-ops-test-value-of-placing-
batteries-in-customers-homes/ 




University of Wisconsin Center for Cooperatives. (n.d.). Rural Electric | Research on the Economic 
Impact of Cooperatives. Retrieved February 18, 2019, from 
http://reic.uwcc.wisc.edu/electric/ 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Rural Utilities Service. (2013). 2011 Statistical Report: Rural 
Electric Borrowers (No. 201–1). Retrieved from Rural Utilities Service website: 
https://www.rd.usda.gov/files/UEP_IP-201-1_2011_ASR.pdf 
U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2017, January 19). Power sector carbon dioxide 
emissions fall below transportation sector emissions - Today in Energy. Retrieved January 
8, 2019, from Today in Energy website: 
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=29612 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. (2017, February 8). Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas 






van Mossel, A., van Rijnsoever, F. J., & Hekkert, M. P. (2018). Navigators through the storm: A 
review of organization theories and the behavior of incumbent firms during transitions. 
Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions, 26, 44–63. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2017.07.001 
Vibrant Clean Energy, LLC. (2018). Minnesota’s Smarter Grid: Pathways Toward a Clean, Reliable 
and Affordable Transportation and Energy System. Retrieved from 
https://www.mcknight.org/wp-content/uploads/Minnesotas-
SmarterGrid_FullReport_NewFormat.pdf 
Wellstone, P., & Casper, B. (2003). Powerline: The First Battle of America’s Energy War. University 
of Minnesota Press. 
World Bank. (2005). Primer of Demand-Side Management. Retrieved from 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTENERGY/Resources/PrimeronDemand-
SideManagement.pdf 
Yakubovich, V., Granovetter, M., & Mcguire, P. (2005). Electric Charges: the social construction of 
rate systems. Theory and Society. Theory and Society, 579–612. 
 



































Load Management Interview Protocol 
Research Questions 
1. How did your utility deploy load management technologies in the 1970s, ‘80s, and ‘90s? 
2. How was fairness constructed between utilities as deployment started and increased? 
How were decisions made to deploy? 
3. How were the supply chains constructed between utilities, contractors, and customers? 
4. How was urgency maintained? 
 
Opening Script: Thank you for meeting with me today. I am a Graduate Researcher and Masters 
Student at the Humphrey School the University of Minnesota, and have been working with Prof. 
Gabe Chan and an interdisciplinary team studying energy policy, technology deployment, business 
models and rural economic development. I am now working on my masters thesis, for which the 
primary goal is to investigate how electric cooperatives deployed load management technologies 
from the 1970s onward. I’ll be speaking with people familiar with what happened at that time all 
throughout the Midwest. The insights I gain will be synthesized into materials and a final thesis 
summarizing the process and history through which electric cooperatives grew and maintained their 
load management programs. 
My questions are meant to be a conversational guide to help me understand your experience with 
load management. 
If it’s still ok with you, I would like to turn the recorder on now. 
Interview structure 
Section Goal: Gain background information, general load management information 
1. Could you briefly describe your experience at UTILITY / involvement with UTILITY?  
a. How long did you work there? What roles did you have? 
 
2. What was your experience with load management technologies or programs prior to the 
program and through the program’s course? 
 
3. What prompted the creation of the program?  
a. Who took the lead in initiating the project [or opposing the project]? What 
percentage of cooperatives were supportive in the beginning? 
b. What were the program’s overall goals? 
 
4. What was the role of local, state, or federal policy in this process at the beginning? 
 
5. How did load management technologies affect the relationship between the power 
supplier and the member utilities? How did they affect the relationships between member 
utilities themselves? 
a. How would you describe the [G&T or JAA/dependent utilities] influence in 
decision-making? 




c. What were some common disagreements? 
d. What formal or informal structures helped smooth over these disagreements? 
 
6. In all, at the beginning, what most enabled you to pursue these innovations? 
a. Could you tell me about where you first learned about these technologies or 
programs? 
b. Where did you get advice from at the beginning? 
 
7. After the program was rolled out, how did you connect the supply chain between the 
utility, customers, and contractors?  
a. What other parts of the chain did you have to connect? 
b. What changes were made and why? 
c. How did you manage the complexity? 
d. What formal or informal processes did you institute? 
 
8. What about your system characteristics or utility circumstances led to changes in the 
program design or rollout? 
a. Were there events or things that happened that changed the philosophy of the 
programs? 
b. What internal policies changed as you learned from the program? What external 
policies changed because of the program? 
 
9. What most helped you deploy quickly? 
a. What slowed your deployment the most? 
b. What in the consumers, the environment, or your networks helped? 
 
10. What issues arose during the construction of this program? And how were they 
managed? 
a. From members/customers? 
b. From member utilities? 
c. From others? 
 
11. How did new technologies or customers classes come to be integrated into the program? 
a. How were members differently affected by these changes?  
b. How were utilities differently affected by these changes? 
 
Section Goal: Get an overall sense of attitude, perceptions, etc. for changes in the 
industry. 
12. What would you have done differently, in hindsight? What could others have done 
differently? 
Concluding Questions 
13. Is there anything that you think is important that I haven’t asked about? 
 
14. Who else should I be speaking to understand load management as it arose in the 1970s 
and ‘80s amongst these electric cooperatives?  
 






Though electric cooperatives are declared “private” organizations by the National Rural 
Electric Cooperative Association, they are still public in generating, transmitting, and distributing 
electricity, information, and policy to local, state, and federal governments (National Rural Electric 
Cooperative Association, 2017). These cooperatives are public in another way: much of the 
background research was already readily available through commission websites, online 
presentations, books, and news articles. Still, retired and current employees and associated actors 
need informed consent to ethically inform a more general history of their cooperatives’ histories. 
These individuals could reasonably be offered anonymity, and so could the distribution electric 
cooperatives, as their individual characteristics could be blended with other regional cooperatives 
of the G&T systems. As G&Ts within this study are the focus of the scale of the study, they’re simply 
impossible to anonymize without losing the meaning of the study. 
There are also good reasons beyond the “inability to conceal identities effectively” to state 
actors’ names, as Guenther (2009) says: 
Concealing the names of the organizations I study would result in lost meanings 
as the names of these organizations represent specific histories, goals, and 
ideologies which even the cleverest pseudonyms would be unlikely to capture. 
Hiding these names would both devalue the [organizations] and reduce the 
strength of my analysis. In mobilizing data that I can reasonably foresee could 
negatively influence an organization, I either omit the data or disconnect the data 
from an organization name and characteristics. 
 
Here I follow Guenther’s case and reasonably omit or disconnect pernicious data from the 
organization’s name. 
Still, there are further political implications for naming the institutions involved. As a 
research project devoted to finding generalized findings with implications for policymaking, this 
thesis is intentionally posing these generation and transmission cooperatives as public entities, 
bringing along both the benefits and drawbacks of public scrutiny. However, given the historical 
nature of this project and the dynamic nature of distributed energy and electric utilities, in general, 




To quote Guenther, 2009: “[M]y hope is that using the actual names of organizations and cities will 
bring voices, places, and histories that are too often forgotten back into view.” 
Electric cooperatives, as part of the national conversation on energy and climate change, 
and rurality in general, are often forgotten, a fact that endears them to me. In the process of 
gathering background information, I was comped for a Beneficial Electrification League conference, 
and as a student working with current cooperative general managers, I often worked only a few 
degrees away from my interviewees. I used methods drawn from participatory action research, 
such as co-creating thesis conclusions with them in and out of interview settings and allowing them 
to edit my background and results, perhaps any feeling of bias is more engagement in general. 
 
